The Afghanistan Golden Crescent Heroin trade increase in the 1980s, just as the Afghan war started between the Soviets and US proxy Forces such as the Mujahedeen. The Guardian the 9th of January 2018, also UN PDFs showing the increase since 1980
"Nevertheless, according to U.S. officials, the United States has failed to investigate or take action against some of those suspected in part because of its desire not to offend a strategic ally, Pakistan's military establishment. Also, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, U.S. narcotics policy in Afghanistan has been subordinated to the war against Soviet influence there, especially under the Reagan administration." The Washington Post 1990 May 13th, U.S. Declines To Probe Afghan Drug Trade
"Question: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs that the American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahiddin in Afghanistan six months before the Soviet intervention. Is this period, you were the national securty advisor to President Carter. You therefore played a key role in this affair. Is this correct?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention [emphasis added throughout].
Q: Despite this risk, you were an advocate of this covert action. But perhaps you yourself desired this Soviet entry into the war and looked for a way to provoke it?
B: It wasn’t quite like that. We didn’t push the Russians to intervene, but we knowingly increased the probability that they would.
Q : When the Soviets justified their intervention by asserting that they intended to fight against secret US involvement in Afghanistan , nobody believed them . However, there was an element of truth in this. You don’t regret any of this today?
B: Regret what? That secret operation was an excellent idea. It had the effect of drawing the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: “We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam war." Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war that was unsustainable for the regime , a conflict that bought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire.
Q: And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?
B : What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Moslems or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the cold war?
Q : “Some agitated Moslems”? But it has been said and repeated: Islamic fundamentalism represents a world menace today...
B: Nonsense! It is said that the West has a global policy in regard to Islam. That is stupid: There isn’t a global Islam. Look at Islam in a rational manner, without demagoguery or emotionalism. It is the leading religion of the world with 1.5 billion followers. But what is t h ere in com m on among fundamentalist Saudi Arabia , moderate Morocco, militarist Pakistan, pro-Western Egypt, or secularist Central Asia? Nothing more than what unites the Christian countries…" The Brzezinski Interview with Le Nouvel Observateur (1998), University Of Arizona
"Heslin’s sole job, it seemed, was to carry water for an exclusive club known as the Foreign Oil Companies Group, a cover for a cartel of major petroleum companies doing business in the Caspian. . . . Another thing I learned was that Heslin wasn’t soloing. Her boss, Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, headed the inter-agency committee on Caspian oil policy, which made him in effect the government’s ambassador to the cartel, and Berger wasn’t a disinterested player. He held $90,000 worth of stock in Amoco, probably the most influential member of the cartel. . . . The deeper I got, the more Caspian oil money I found sloshing around Washington" Robert Baer (Ex CIA), See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’S War on terrorism
"In the United Kingdom, a key window on BCCI's support of terrorism was an informant named Ghassan Qassem, the former manager of the Sloan Street branch of BCCI in London. Qassem had been given the accounts of Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal at BCCI, and then proceeded, while at BCCI, to provide detailed information on the accounts to British and American intelligence, apparently as a paid informant, according to press accounts based on interviews with Qassem" The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations John Kerry, Hank Brown, Page 68 (the quote in the book is smaller)
"From April 1990 forward, the Bank of England had now inadvertently become partner to a cover-up of BCCI's criminality." The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations John Kerry, Hank Brown, Page 363
"Adham's historic relationship with U.S. intelligence was indeed unusually close. While Adham was still in place as the CIA's liaison in 1977, the CIA's station chief for Saudi Arabia, Raymond H. Close, chose to go to work for Adham upon leaving the CIA, according to press reports at the time which Close has only denied since the BCCI scandal broke.(38) As Jeff Gerth of the New York Times reported in 1981: In the case of Mr. Close, the one time station chief in Saudi Arabia, former Government officials say his actions, while in the CIA and since retirement, are often clouded in mystery. In the first place, some think Mr. Close may still be working for the CIA in some capacity, although he officially retired in 1977. They add that a further complicating factor is that some Saudis privately share the same perception. The Times account describes how Close had actually given approval to weapons sales from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan in the early 1970's, in contravention of the "official policy" enunciated by the American ambassador, and states that Close went into business with Kamal Adham upon leaving the CIA" The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations John Kerry, Hank Brown, Page 300
"a U.S. Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) team worked with Colombian military officers on the 1991 intelligence reorganization that resulted in the creation of killer networks that identified and killed civilians suspected of supporting guerrillas" Human Rights Watch, November 1996
“I received a visit from a group of sinister individuals, all dressed in black, who informed me they were representatives - and members of - a Washington law firm they told me that they had financed the ‘liberation movement’ of Castillo Armas, who had committed himself to certain payments. On his death he still owed them $1,800,000, and as they considered me to be his heir they held me responsible for payment.” My War With Communism Miguel Fuentes, Page 63-64 ( extended quote from what is in Peter Dales Scott's book)
"Shortly before Sihanouk’s overthrow, a New York Times report revealed that the United States had used the Khmer Serei, an organization “dedicated to the overthrow of the legitimate government of Cambodia, on covert missions into that country in 1967, according to testimony at the trial of a Green Beret captain convicted in 1968 of killing one of the members of the sect" NYT 28th of January 1970 Page 1, (also carries onto page 9 and mentions operation cherry)
Air America Civilian Facade Gives It Latitude In East Asia, NYT April 5th 1970 Page 1, 22
"Military leaders are often far less suspicious of the West than civilian leaders because they themselves are more emotionally secure. . . . Military rule itself can become sterile if it does not lead to an interest in total national development. . . . This leads U.S. to the conclusion that the military in the underdeveloped countries can make a major contribution to strengthening essentially administrative functions " Lucian R.W. be, “Armies in the Process of Political Modernization,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries
"Tell me where you put your money, and I’ll tell you what your foreign policy is. If you put over 90 cents of your foreign policy dollar into the Pentagon and the CIA, then your policy is going to emphasize a military approach, a secretive, under the [table] approach, to the problems. For example, the budget for the White House Drug Office, this office of Narcotics Control, is greater than the State Department and the Commerce Department put together. Now what possible sense can that make? You are starving diplomacy, you are exalting a military approach to problems. And frankly, all the experience we’ve had is that these anti- or counter-narcotics programs do not work. During the lifetime of the program in Colombia, the last three years, this intensive counter-narcotics program, exports to the United States have more than doubled" Us Ambassador Robert White to Colombia
"in my 30-year history in the Drug Enforcement Administration and related agencies, the major targets of my investigations almost invariably turned out to be working for the CIA" DEA officer Dennis Dayle