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Pre WWII Funding Tyrants, Coups And Revolutions

funding tyrants and revolutions
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"I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed (to) Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them [the Philippine Islands] back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died." —William McKinley, President of the United States, 1899, Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (Boston, 1916) vol. 2 Page 110-111

"Gave equal rights to Americans in the development of the nation’s natural resources and the operation of its public utilities" NYT 12th of March 1947 (Philippine-US Trade act Passed in congress)

In the Philippines, lumbering interests and major sugar interests have forced tens of thousands of simple, backward villagers to leave areas where they have lived for centuries. When these poor people flee to other areas, it should be quite obvious that they in turn then infringe upon the territorial rights of other villagers or landowners. This creates violent rioting or at least sporadic outbreaks of banditry, that last lowly recourse of dying and terrorized people. Then when the distant government learns of the banditry and rioting, it must offer some safe explanation. The last thing that regional government would want to do would be to say that the huge lumbering or paper interests had driven the people out of their ancestral homeland. In the Philippines it is customary for the local/regional government to get a 10 percent rake-off on all such enterprise and for national politicians to get another 10 percent. So the safe explanation becomes “Communist-inspired subversive insurgency.” The word for this in the Philippines is Huk." COL Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the World Page 103


"It is my contention that the representatives of this Government [United States] made

possible the revolution on the isthmus of Panama. That had it not been for the

interference of this Government a successful revolution could not possibly have occurred, and I contend that this Government violated the treaty of 1846. I will be able to produce evidence to show that the declaration of independence which was promulgated in Panama on the 3rd day of November, 1903, was prepared right here in New York City and carried down there — prepared in the office of Wilson (sic) Nelson Cromwell" The Story of Panama: Hearings on the Rainey Resolution Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 1913 Page 52-53 or 60


"One is impressed immediately by the sense of national harmony. ... There is a very real and pervasive dedication to Chairman Mao and Maoist principles. Whatever the price of the Chinese Revolution, it has obviously succeeded not only in producing more efficient and dedicated administration, but also in fostering high morale and community purpose. General social and economic progress is no less impressive. ... The enormous social advances of China have benefited greatly from the singleness of ideology and purpose. ... The social experiment in China under Chairman Mao's leadership is one of the most important and successful in history." David Rockefeller China Traveller 1973 August 10th


"Farben at that time produced 100 percent of German synthetic rubber, 95 percent of German poison gas (including all the Zyklon B gas used in the concentration camps), 90 percent of German plastics, 88 percent of German magnesium, 84 percent of German explosives, 70 percent of German gunpowder, 46 percent of German high octane (aviation) gasoline, and 33 percent of German synthetic gasoline" October 21st 1945 NYT Page 12 L, Referenced here Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1073

"The facts disclosed by this investigation concerning I. G. Farben's part in supplying the German armed forces with weapons of destruction make it clear that Dr. von Schnitzler, member of I. G. Farben's managing board of directors and chairman of its all-powerful commercial committee, was not boasting when he stated in an address of welcome to the Spanish Ambassador on February 10, 1943: "But only during the war could German chemistry prove itself worthy of the task. It is no exaggeration to say that without the services of German chemistry performed under the Four-Year Plan the prosecution of modern war would have been unthinkable". 3. Farben was a Nazi agency for world-wide military and economic

espionage I. G. Farben's organization, both domestic and international, served the Nazi government as a principal agency for military and economic espionage throughout the world." Dr Von Schnitzeler of IG Farben stating to Spanish ambassador, Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress, July 2nd 1945 Part 1-3 Page 947 or Page 317

The 1945 interrogation of I.G. Farben director yon Schnitzler reads:

"Q. What did you do when they told you that I.G. chemicals was [sic] being used to kill, to murder people held in concentration camps?

A. I was horrified.

Q. Did you do anything about it?

A. I kept it for me [to myself] because it was too terrible .... I asked Muller-Cunradi is it known to you and Ambros and other directors in Auschwitz that the gases and chemicals are being used to murder people.

Q. What did he say?

"It is true that since 1934 or 1935, soon after the establishment of the Vermittlungsstelle W in the different works, theoretical war plant games had been arranged to examine how the effect of bombing on certain factories would materialize. It was particularly taken into consideration what would happen if 100 or 500 kilogram bombs would fall on a certain factory and what would be the result of it. It is also right that the word Kriegsspiele was used for it.The Kriegsspiele were prepared by Mr. Ritter and Dr. Eckell, later on partly by Dr. yon Brunning by personal order on Dr. Krauch's own initiative or by order of the Air Force, it is not known to me. The tasks were partly given by the Vermittlung-sstelle W and partly by officers of the Air Force. A number of officers of all groups of the Wehrmacht (Navy, Air Force, and Army) participated in these Kriegsspiele. The places which were hit by bombs were marked in a map of the plant so that it could be ascertained which parts of the plant were damaged, for example a gas meter or an important pipe line. As soon as the raid finished, the management of the plant ascertained the damages and reported which part of the plant had to stop working; they further reported what time would be required in order to repair the damages. In a following meeting the consequences of the Kriegsspiele were described and it was ascertained that in the case of Leuna [plant] the damages involved were considerably high; especially it was found out that alterations of the pipe lines were to be made at considerable cost" Dr Struss testimony to the Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress, July 2nd 1945 Part 5-11 Page 1094 or 468

"January 25. Thursday. Our Commercial Attache brought Dr. Engelbrecht, chairman of the Vacuum Oil Company in Hamburg, to see me. Engelbrecht repeated what he had said a year ago: "The Standard Oil Company of New York, the parent company of the Vacuum, has spent 10,000,000 marks in Germany trying to find oil resources and building a great refinery near the Hamburg harbor." Engelbrecht is still boring wells and finding a good deal of crude oil in the Hanover region, but he had no hope of great deposits. He hopes Dr. Schacht will subsidize his company as he does some German companies that have found no crude oil. The Vacuum spends all its earnings here, employs 1,000 men and never sends any of its money home. I could give him no encouragement" Ambassador Dodds Diary 1933-38 edited by William E Dodd Jr and Martha Dodd Page 310-311

"These men were hardly out of the building before the lawyer came in again to report his difficulties. I could not do anything I asked him, however : Why did the Standard Oil Company of New York send $1,000,000 over here in December, 1933, to aid the Germans in making gasoline from soft coal for war emergencies? Why do the International Harvester people continue to manufacture in Germany when their company gets nothing out of the country and when it has failed to collect its war losses? He saw my point and agreed that it looked foolish and that it only means greater losses if another war breaks loose." Ambassador Dodds Diary edited by William E Dodd Jr and Martha Dodd Page 363

"This investigation has confirmed certain data heretofore presented to the Truman, Bone, and Kilgore committees by the Department of Justice with respect to this transaction which so seriously imperiled the war preparations of the United States. The story, in short, is that under the so - called Jasco agreement, synthetic rubber was to come under Farben's "sphere of influence” ' Standard was determined, however, to have an absolute monopoly of synthetic rubber developments in the United States, if and when Farben released the American rights to its process to Standard in accordance with the Jasco agreement. Accordingly, Standard fully accomplished I.G.'s purpose of preventing United States production by dissuading American rubber companies from undertaking independent research in developing synthetic rubber processes" Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085

"Colonel BERNSTEIN. This Standard accomplished by falsely creating the impression that it had already received the buna process from Farben and was attempting to work out a scheme for licensing the process to the American rubber companies. As a matter of fact Farben had no intention of divulging the process. One conclusion which can be drawn from Standard's "stringing along” of other companies is that it did not want them to proceed with independent research thus preventing Standard from ever having a monopoly in the field" Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085-1086

"Thus, Dr. Loehr indicated that, pursuant to conversations between Mr. Howard of Standard Oil and I. G.-Standard had agreed to keep American firms out of the synthetic rubber field and would let them enter it only if compelled to do so by forces beyond its control.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, had agreed to block research in this country?

"Colonel BERNSTEIN. Yes, sir; at a time when war was in the air. By 1939, however, synthetic rubber development had reached a stage where Mr. Howard of Standard Oil stated that it would no longer be possible for him to keep the information in regard to the buna processes from the American companies. Nevertheless, he assured Î. G. that Standard would manage to stay "on top of the whole scheme.” As time dragged on and the licenses were not forthcoming, the clamor of the American rubber companies became so intense that Standard, not wanting to reveal the true situation, turned to Farben for an excuse to give the rubber companies. Howard of Standard, in October 1939, at a meeting with I. G. representatives in Basle, stated that he had to be provided with an excuse for not getting the knowhow. I. G. obligingly cabled Standard Oil to the effect that the authorities would not permit the information to be given to the American firm. “These are the conclusions," said Dr. Loehr, "which seem to disclose that I. G. impaired the military strength of the United States," which I would have called an understatement" Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085-1086

"The CHAIRMAN. That identical excuse was furnished in the courts of the United States when Standard was being sued. It was furnished before the Truman committee as an excuse for not releasing the patent, as an excuse for saying they had no know-how, because Farben refused to give them the know-how, and on a statement that they had nothing but the right to operate under a patent with which they had no know-how, and Farben would not give it to them, showing a conspiracy between Mr. Howard of Standard, the vice president, and Farben, to still hoodwink and stay on top, and apparently Standard is still able to stay on top, as evidenced by the shutting down of these other independent plants.

At that point in the record I want to introduce some testimony taken at a previous occasion with reference to the question of alcohol and petroleum and the way that has been manipulated in the past 6 months." Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085-1086

"I. G. Farben acted in a representative capacity for the Nazi Government in its relations with its cartel partners. By virtue of its dominant position in the world chemical industry, Farben was in an excellent position to use its numerous cartel connections to prepare Germany

To recite the examples of such use would be to recapitulate material which is already, for the most part, public knowledge. An outstanding example, however, is Farben's successful effort, by means of cartel agreements with Standard Oil, to delay the development and use of buna rubber in the United States until at least 1940 while at the same time producing sufficient buna in Germany to make the German Army and German industry independent of rubber imports" Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085

"The CHAIRMAN. In previous hearings this committee has heard much evidence showing how cartel agreements with German firms affected our national security. In this evidence only one conclusion can be reached, namely, that German companies, in conspiracy with the Nazi government, purposely crippled our war production. This statement bears out those statements. Don't you think so—that it was intentional, sir?

"Colonel BERNSTEIN. That is right, sir, and one would hope that our business enterprises would learn that fact now. As has already been demonstrated before this and other congressional committees, I. G. used its extensive cartel connections with foreign firms to further this policy of the German Government. The dangers inherent in such monopolistic agreements take on a new significance when the activities of one of the parties are subordinated to the over-all policy of its government." Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 8-11 December 11-12 1945 Page 1085

"Substantially the same pattern of behavior was pursued by the Paris office of the Chase Bank during German occupation, An examination of the correspondence between Chase, New York, and Chase, France, from the date of the fall of France to May, 1942 discloses that: (1) the manager of the Paris office appeased and collaborated with the Germans to place the Chase banks in a "privileged position;" (2) the Germans held the Chase Bank in a very special esteem — owing to the international activities of our (Chase) head office and the pleasant relations which the Paris branch has been maintaining with many of their (German) banks and their (German) local organizations and higher officers; (3) the Paris manager was "very vigorous in enforcing restrictions against Jewish property, even going so far as to refuse to release funds belonging to Jews in anticipation that a decree with retroactive provisions prohibiting such release might be published in the near future by the occupying authorities;" (4) the New York office despite the above information took no direct steps to remove the undesirable manager from the Paris office since it "might react against our (Chase) interests as we are dealing, not with a theory but with a situation" Morgenthau Diary Committee On The Judiciary United States Senate November 20, 1967 (Germany) Page 616 or 607

"a. Niederman, of Swiss nationality, manager of Chase, Paris, was unquestionably a collaborator;

b. The Chase Head Office in New York was informed of Nieder-man's collaborationist policy but took no steps to remove him. Indeed there is ample evidence to show that the Head Office in New York viewed Niederman's good relations with the Germans as an excellent means of preserving, unimpaired, the position of the Chase Bank in France;

c. The German authorities were anxious to keep the Chase open and indeed took exceptional measures to provide sources of revenue;

d. The German authorities desired "to be friends" with the important American banks because they expected that these banks would be useful after the war as an instrument of German policy in the United States;

e. The Chase, Paris showed itself most anxious to please the German authorities

in every possible way. For example, the Chase zealously maintained the account of the German Embassy in Paris, "as every little thing helps" (to maintain the excellent relations between Chase and the German authorities);

f. The whole objective of the Chase policy and operation was to maintain the position of the bank at any cost." Morgenthau Diary Committee On The Judiciary United States Senate November 20 , 1967 (Germany) Page 801

"The closing of an agreement with Standard was necessary for technical, commercial, and financial reasons: technically, because the specialized experience which was available only in a big oil company was necessary to the further development of our process, and no such industry existed in Germany; commercially, because in the absence of state economic control in Germany at that time, IG had to avoid a competitive struggle with the great oil powers, who always sold the best gasoline at the lowest price in contested markets; Financially, because IG, which had already spent extraordinarily large sums for the development of the process, had to seek financial relief in order to be able to continue development in other new technical fields, such as buna" Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, Volume 7 Page 1304 or 1340 IG Farben commentary on Haslams article

"Especially in the case of iso - octane , it is shown that we owe much to the Americans because in our own work we could draw widely on American information on the behavior of fuels in motors. Moreover, we were also kept currently informed by the Americans on the progress of their production process and its further development. Shortly before the war, a new method for the production of iso - octane was found in America - alkylation with isomerization as a preliminary step. This process, which Mr Haslam does not mention at all, originates in fact entirely with the Americans and has become known to us in detail in its separate stages through our agreements with them , and is being used very extensively by us." Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, Volume 7 Page 1306 or 1342 IG Farben commentary on Haslams article

"As a consequence of our contracts with the Americans, we received from them, above and beyond the agreement, many very valuable contributions for the synthesis and improvement of motor fuels and lubricating oils, which Just now during the war are most useful to us; and we also received other advantages from them. Primarily, the following may be mentioned:

(1) Above all, improvement of fuels through the addition of tetraethyl-lead and the manufacture of this product. It need not be especially mentioned that without tetraethl-lead the present methods of warfare would be impossible. The fact that since the beginning of the war we could produce tetraethyl-lead is entirely due to the circumstances that, shortly before, the Americans had presented us with the production plans, complete with their know-how. It was, moreover, the first time that the Americans decided to give a license on this process in a foreign country (besides communication of unprotected secrets) and this only on our urgent requests to Standard Oil to fulfill our wish. Contractually we could not demand it, and we found out later that the War Department in Washington gave its permission only after long deliberation.

(2) Conversion of low-molecular unsaturates into usable gasoline (polymerization). Much work in this field has been done here as well as in America. But the Americans were the first to carry the process through on a large scale, which suggested to us also to develop the process on a large technical scale. But above and beyond that, plants built according to American processes are functioning in Germany.

(3) In the field of lubricating oils as well, Germany through the contract with America, learned of experience which is extraordinarily important for present day warfare. In this connection, we obtained not only the experience of Standard, but, through Standard, the experiences of General Motors and other large American motor companies as well. (4) As a further remarkable example of advantageous effect for us of the contract between IG and Standard Oil, the following should be mentioned: in the years 1934 / 1935 our government had the greatest interest in gathering from abroad a stock of especially valuable mineral oil products (in particular, aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil), and holding it in reserve to an amount approximately equal to 20 million dollars at market value. The German Government asked IG if it were not possible, on the basis of its friendly relations with Standard Oil, to buy this amount in Farben's name; actually, however, as trustee of the German Government. The fact that we actually succeeded by means of the most difficult negotiations in buying the quantity desired by our government from the American Standard Oil Company and the Dutch — English Royal — Dutch — Shell group and in transporting it to Germany, was made possible only through the aid of the Standard Oil Co." Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, Volume 7 Page 1309 or 1345 IG Farben commentary on Haslams article

"Since the beginning of the war we have been in a position to produce lead tetraethyl solely because, a short time before the outbreak of the war, the Americans had established plants for us ready for production and supplied us with all available experience. In this manner we did not need to perform the difficult work of development because we could start production right away on the basis of all the experience that the Americans had had for years." NYT October 19th 1945

"At the request of the Air Ministry and on direct order of Goering, I.G . Farben procured in 1938, 500 tons of tetraethyl lead from the Ethyl Export Corporation, of the United States. The Air Ministry needed this lead because it is indispensable to the manufacture of high octane aviation gasoline and because they wanted to store up the lead in Germany to tide the Air Ministry over until such time as the plant in Germany could manufacture sufficient quantities. We were producing sufficient quantities of tetraethyl - lead for ordinary purposes but the storage of the 500 tons of tetraethyl - lead was undertaken because in case of war Germany did not have enough tetraethyl - lead to wage war, for which reason the German Reich pursued a stockpiling policy . 66 * * * Finally , it was decided to procure the tetraethyl - lead on a loan basis . All the gentlemen were very bewildered as Goering demanded a report by noon the next day. It was commonly known that tetraethyl - lead was needed as the German production in tetraethyl - lead while sufficient for peacetime purposes , was not sufficient to wage war, and we had to obtain it immediately for aviation gasoline." Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, Volume 8 Page 1272-1273

"BERLIN, Dec. 19.--A rumor is current here that Henry Ford, the American automobile manufacturer, is financing Adolph Hitler's nationalist and Anti-Semitic movement in Munich. Indeed, the Berlin Tageblatt has made an appeal to the American Ambassador in Berlin to investigate and interfere" NYT December 19th 1920, and rumoured he has a portrait of ford above his desk

Henry Ford receives Grand Cross of the German Eagle award NYT August 1st 1938

"(1) the business of the Ford subsidiaries in France substantially increased ; ( 2 ) their production was solely for the benefit of the Germans and the countries under its occupation ; ( 3 ) the Germans have " shown clearly their wish to protect the Ford interests ” because of the attitude of strict neutrality maintained by Henry Ford and the late Edsel Ford ; and ( 4 ) the increased activity of the French Ford subsidiaries on behalf of the Germans received the commendation of the Ford family in America" Morgenthau Diary Committee On The Judiciary United States Senate November 20 , 1967 (Germany) Page 616

The Secret Meeting of 20 February 1933 (German: Geheimtreffen vom 20. Februar 1933) was a secret meeting held by Adolf Hitler and 20 to 25 industrialists at the official residence of the President of the Reichstag Hermann Göring in Berlin. Its purpose was to raise funds for the election campaign of the Nazi Party. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, Volume 7 Page 16-17 or 7. IG Farben contributing 400,000 Reichsmarks, other German industrialists contributed too.

"September 1st Friday Henry Mann of the National City Bank spoke of the conversation he and Mr Aldnch had had some ten days before with the Chancellor at his summer place. The ideas advocated by Hitler were the same as those he had advanced to Professor Coar. He is a fanatic on the Jewish problem he has no conception of international relationships he considers himself a German Messiah but despite Hitler’s attitude these bankers feel they can work with him" Ambassador Dodd's Diary edited by William E Dodd Jr and Martha Dodd Page 45

"At 1.30 Ivy Lee and his son James came to lunch. Ivy Lee showed himself at once a capitalist and an advocate of Fascism." Ambassador Dodd's Diary edited by William E Dodd Jr and Martha Dodd Page 87 Ivy Lee the Rockefeller public relations man.

"a. Morgan and Company regarded itself as a French bank, and therefore obligated to observe French banking laws and regulations, whether Nazi inspired or not; and did actually do so;

b. Morgan and Company was most anxious to preserve the continuity of its house in France, and, in order to achieve this security, worked out a modus vivendi with the German authorities;

c. Morgan and Company had tremendous prestige with the German authorities, and the Germans boasted of the splendid cooperation of Morgan and Company;

d. Morgan continued its prewar relations with the great French industrial and commercial concerns which were working for Germany, including the Renault Works, since confiscated by the French Government, Puegeqt [sic], Citroen, and many others.

e. The power of Morgan and Company in France bears no relation to the small financial resources of the firm, and the enquiry now in progress will be of real value in allowing us for the first time to study the Morgan pattern in Europe and the manner in which Morgan has used its great power;

f. Morgan and Company constantly sought its ends by playing one government against another in the coldest and most unscrupulous manner." Morgenthau Diary Committee On The Judiciary United States Senate November 20 , 1967 (Germany) Page 800 or 791

"You might also be interested in knowing, Mr. Chairman, that the top I. G. Farben people and others, when we questioned them about these activities, were inclined at times to be very indignant. Their general attitude and expectation was that the war was over and we ought now to be assisting them in helping to get I.G. Farben and German industry back on its feet . Some of them have outwardly said that this questioning and investigation was, in their estimation, only a phenomenon of short duration, because as soon as things got a dittle settled they would expect their friends in the United States and in England to be coming over. Their friends, so they said, would put a stop to activities such as these investigations and would see that they got the treatment which they regarded as proper and that assistance would be given to them to help reestablish their industry" Elimination of German Resources for War Hearings before a Subcommittee of the committee on military affairs United states senate 79th Congress Vol 1-6 July 2nd, 1945 Page 652 or 14

"On September 15, 1939, while the Netherlands were still neutral in the war, Shell offered to supply acids to I. G. Farben's foreign customers. Chemnyco relayed Shell's offer to Germany, stating that Shell “suggests that if under prevailing conditions you are prevented from delivering formic acetic and propionic acid to certain foreign countries you give Shell Developinent temporary permission to sell these acids from the production of the pilot plant which Shell is erecting in California. Shell is aware that according to the license agreement they are not allowed to export the acids from the United States, but they believe that it might be in the interest of both parties if they would make deliveries to customers whom you cannot supply… I. G. Farben rejected the proposal on September 29, 1939, apparently feeling confident that British blockades would be ineffective. The rejection of its offer did not discourage Shell" Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 462

"By February 1940 the Germans recognized that they were going to have considerable difficulty in supplying their foreign customers. Consequently, I. G. Farben reconsidered the Shell proposal and granted them permission… By initiating this proposal and then accepting the terms laid down by I. G. Farben, Shell Chemical indicated that it was willing to maintain the foreign trade of I. G. Farben which the British blockade was trying to prevent. Obviously, Shell was actuated entirely by its own narrow business interests and gave no consideration whatever to the fact that it was aiding the German Government in its direct war against Britain and its indirect war against the United States" Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 463

"Regardless of how the ordinary British, American, or Dutch citizen might characterize this deal, it did not involve any technical violation of law. Shell, as an international corporation, was quite naturally and quite legally grabbing every opportunity to expand its foreign trade, letting the political and military chips fall where they may. Not until Germany actually invaded Dutch Shell's native country in May 1940 did Shell abrogate this agreement with I. G. Farben. On May 13, 1940, the day Queen Wilhelmina had to flee from the Netherlands and only two days before Holland finally capitulated, Shell wrote to Chemnyco that “because of the recent political developments, we are no longer in a position to discuss any arrangement as referred to in your letter of May 9th. We have not yet decided whether or not we shall erect a plant for the production of the acids in question” Thus ended Shell's effort to help maintain Hitler's foreign markets. The question still left unanswered is what would have happened if Shell's country of incorporation happened to be an ally of Hitler or at least not a victim." Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 463

"On our side, the practices of Standard Oil and Shell are probably representative of the way international corporations in general have cooperated with foreign business interests in their manipulation of American patents. After all, the corporations involved rank very high in the world of business and their policies and practices have a profound influence on the methods of doing business adopted by others. These case studies can therefore be considered to be typical and as such they point to an alarming situation in the patent field the correction of which is essential if maximum war production is to be attained" Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 463

"Far more important is the fact that these international corporations seem oblivious of the political and military implications of their world-wide patent pools and understandings with foreign corporations. World trade never was a mere matter of business but the dangers inherent in neglecting its political and military aspects never were as great as they have been in recent years. The mechanization of war and the advent of Hitler with his barter diplomacy have intensified tremendously the need for giving primary attention to these features of foreign trade. I. G. Farben, for example, in recent years was first and foremost an instrumentality of Nazi political and military strategy and only secondarily a business enterprise. But our own international corporations seem to have disregarded these radical developments" Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 463

"Standard Oil knew as early as January 1934 that every foreign business move made by I. G. Farben had to be disclosed first to the Nazi Government and approved by them. That did not affect Standard Oil's performance under the 1929 partnership agreement even though it necessarily curtailed I. G. Farben's performance thereunder. The attitude of the international corporation seems to be that as long as it is legal and good business, that is in the opinion of corporate management, then it is all right to enter into patent pools and friendly agreements with foreign corporations no matter what the latter's motive might be or how such a deal might affect the welfare of the United States as a political and military power. In defense of this position, businessmen argue that political and military matters are the province of government and that by taking such a view business is merely sticking to its own knitting." Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 464

"With specific reference to the patent phase of international business, we must make certain that patents can no longer be used by foreign interests and their American friends as legal devices to attain illegal ends. Remedial machinery and legislation must be provided so that what I. G. Farben did in the acetylene field will not be repeated in the future" Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 464

"Government must act with speed and thoroughness if it is to end the era when United States patents could be used by foreign interests to enhance their own international position, hinder production here, evade the antitrust laws, keep American producers out of export markets, thwart American research, get the benefits of our discoveries without fully reciprocating, and, finally, obstruct our war-production program. By recognizing that world trade, including international patent pools, are matters of public concerns, not plain, ordinary private business, the patent system of this country can be made to operate more effectively in the public interest than it has in recent years." Scientific and Technical Mobilization, United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs Hearing, March 30, 1943 Page 464


"Soviet government stronger today than ever before. It's authority and power greatly consolidated by dissolution of constituent Assembly… cannot urge too strongly importance of prompt recognition of Bolshevik authority…. Sisson approves this text and requests you to show cable to creel. Thacher and Wardwell concur" Russian-American relations, documents and papers doc 64 Page 77 Raymond Robins cable to William Boyce Thompson

"I had been with the American Red Cross people at Odessa. I was there when the Red

Army took possession of Odessa. At that time I was favorably inclined toward the Soviet Government, because I was a socialist and had been a member of that party for 20 years. I must admit that to a certain extent I helped to form the Soviet Government of Odessa" Conditions In Russia House Committee On Foreign Affairs 66th Congress Third Session Jan to March 1921 Page 6 , Jacob H Rubin

"The doctor’s wife took my wife and the boys out driving, and was very kind to them. But she was a mere mortal, whereas the chauffeur was a magician, a titan, a superman I With a wave of his hand, he made the machine obey his slightest command. To sit beside him was the supreme delight. When they went into a tea-room, the boys would anxiously demand of their mother, “Why doesn’t the chauffeur come in?” Leon Trotsky My Life Page 21 (Trotsky living in New York, very well before the revolution)

"I saw that his own mind was made up. He had been greatly impressed, as Lord Milner told me afterwards, by an interview with Colonel Thompson of the American Red Cross, who had just returned from Russia and who had denounced in blunt language the folly of the Allies in not opening up negotiations with the Bolsheviks.... Three days later all my doubts were put at rest. I was to go to Russia as head of a special mission to establish unofficial relations with the Bolsheviks.... Lord Milner I saw almost daily. Five days before my departure I dined alone with him at Brook's. He was in his most inspiring mood. He talked to me with a charming frankness about the war, about the future of England, about his own career, and about the opportunities of youth— He was, too, very far from being the Jingo and the Conservative reactionary whom popular opinion at one time represented him to be. On the contrary, many of his views on society were startlingly modern. He believed in the highly organized state, in which service, efficiency, and hard work were more important than titles or money-bags" Bruce Lockhart British Agent Page 200, 201, 206

"I had been selected for this Russian mission not by the Foreign Secretary but by the War Cabinet—actually by Lord Milner and Mr. Lloyd George" Bruce Lockhart British Agent Page 208

"Another new acquaintance of these first days in the Bolshevized St Petersburg was Raymond Robins, the head of the American Red Cross Mission.... He had been a leading figure in Roosevelt's "Bull Moose" campaign for the American Presidency in 1912. Although a rich man himself, he was an anti-capitalist.... Hitherto, his two heroes had been Roosevelt and Cecil Rhodes. Now Lenin had captured his imagination.... Robins was the only man whom Lenin was always willing to see and who ever succeeded in imposing his own personality on the unemotional Bolshevik leader. In a less official sense Robins had a similar mission to my own. He was the intermediary between the Bolsheviks and the American Government and had set himself the task of persuading President Wilson to recognize the Soviet regime." Bruce Lockhart British Agent Page 222-223

"I returned from our interview to our flat to find an urgent message from Robins requesting me to come to see him at once. I found him in a state of great agitation. He had been in conflict with Saalkind, a nephew of Trotsky and then Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Saalkind had been rude, and the American, who had a promise from Lenin that, whatever happened, a train would always be ready for him at an hour's notice, was determined to exact an apology or to leave the country. When I arrived, he had just finished telephoning to Lenin. He had delivered his ultimatum, and Lenin had promised to give a reply within ten minutes. I waited, while Robins fumed. Then the telephone rang and Robins picked up the receiver. Lenin had capitulated. Saalkind was dismissed from his post. But he was an old member of the Party. Would Robins have any objection if Lenin sent him as a Bolshevik emissary to Beme? Robins smiled grimly. "Thank you, Mr. Lenin," he said. "As I can't send the son of a bitch to hell, 'burned' is the next best thing you can do with him." Bruce Lockhart British Agent Page 228

"You will hear it said that I am an agent of Wall Street; that I am the servant of William B. Thompson to get Altai Copper for him; that I have already got 500,000 acres of the best timber land in Russia for myself; that I have already copped off the Trans-Siberian Railway; that they have given me a monopoly of the platinum in Russia; that this explains my working for the soviet.... You will hear that talk Now, I do not think it is true, Commissioner, but let us assume it is true. Let us assume that I am here to capture Russia for Wall Street and American business men. Let us assume that you are a British wolf and I arn an American wolf, and that when this war is over we are going to eat each other up for the Russian market; let us do so in perfectly frank, man fashion, but let us assume at the same time that we are fairly intelligent wolves, and that we know that if we do not hunt together in this hour the German wolf will eat us both up." U.S. Cong., Senate, Bolshevik Propaganda, Subcommittee of the Committee on the

Judiciary, 65th Cong., 1919, p. 802.


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