The Gulf War And Sanction Years 1990-2003
Pre-1991 Claims Of Neutrality
"GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. EnvoyThe New York Times Sept. 23, 1990
"Mr Kelly: We have no defense treaty relationship with any Gulf country. That is clear. We support the security and independence of friendly states in the region. Ever since the Truman administration, we have maintained Naval forces in the Gulf because of our interest in stability in that region. We are calling for a peaceful resolution of any differences in that area and we hope and trust and believe that the sovereignty of every state in the Gulf ought to be respected.
Mr. HAMILTION: Do we have a commitment to our friends in the Gulf in the event that they are engaged in oil or territorial disputes with their neighbors ?
Mr. KELLY: As I said, Mr. Chairman, we have no defense treaty relationships with any of the countries. We have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes or on internal OPEC deliberations, but we have certainly, as have all administrations, resoundingly called for the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences in the area.
Mr. HAMILTON: If Iraq, for example, charged across the border into Kuwait, for whatever reason, what would be our position with regard to the use of U.S. forces ?
Mr. KELLY: That, Mr. Chairman, is a hypothetical or a contingency, the kind of which I can't get into. Suffice it to say we would be extremely concerned, but I cannot get into the realm of '' what if answers.
Mr. HAMILTON: In that circumstance, it is correct to say, however, that we do not have a treaty commitment which would obligate us to engage U.S. forces ?
Mr. KELLY: That is correct.
Mr. HAMILTON: That is correct, is it not ?
Mr. KELLY: That is correct , sir ..” Developments in the Middle East, July 1990: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, July 31, 1990, Volume 4 Page 14
Evidence The US Never Intended To Be Neutral And Warnings Of An Invasion
"On Oct. 31, Iraq released what it claimed was a captured Kuwaiti intelligence document reporting on a week of meetings held with American officials, including CIA Director William Webster, during mid-November last year. The document reads, “We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic structure in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border.” The CIA acknowledged that Webster had received a “routine courtesy call” from senior Kuwaiti officials on the indicated date but insisted that nothing about Kuwait’s relations with Iraq had been discussed “at that meeting.”" Congress Must Take a Hard Look at Iraq’s Charges Against Kuwait : Geopolitics: Before the U.S. exercises the ‘war option,’ we must assess the regional belief that Hussein was responding to provocative Kuwaiti policies. BY G. HENRY M. SCHULER DEC. 2, 1990
"We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level." CIA Says Iraq’s Kuwait Document Won’t Wash : Intrigue: It describes a meeting that never took place, U.S. says. Baghdad cited the paper as proof of a conspiracy. LA Times NOV. 1, 1990
"When a reporter asked Mashat to assess why the memo seemed to run directly opposite to the thrust of Glaspie’s meeting with Hussein, the ambassador said that the Glaspie meeting “is part and parcel of the setup.” Critics of the State Department have charged that Glaspie’s message, delivered on the instructions of her superiors, gave a “green light” to the Iraqi aggression" CIA Says Iraq’s Kuwait Document Won’t Wash : Intrigue: It describes a meeting that never took place, U.S. says. Baghdad cited the paper as proof of a conspiracy. LA Times NOV. 1, 1990
"As Iraqi forces massed along Kuwait's border on Aug. 1, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst named Charlie Allen walked into the offices of the National Security Council's Middle East staff.
"This is your final warning," he is reliably said to have told them. Iraq, he said, would invade Kuwait by day's end.
It was not the first time that Mr. Allen, a 32-year C.I.A. veteran with the ominous-sounding title of national intelligence officer for warning, had sounded the Kuwait alarm. Until the last hours of Iraq's sword-rattling, when a handful of others joined him, Mr. Allen had been the leading doomsayer among analysts tracking Iraq's military preparations. For Mr. Allen, associates say, shunning the beaten path is standard fare.
So, apparently, is what happened next. His forecast was disregarded, and top White House and Pentagon officials were surprised at home when Iraq marched into Kuwait on the morning of Aug. 2." Washington at Work; C.I.A. Sidelines Its Gulf Cassandra NYT Jan. 24, 1991
"Despite the qualifiers that Kelly put into place about America’s preference for peaceful solutions to disputes, the only thing the Iraqi regime heard was that we had no legal obligation or even any mechanism to react to an invasion. That had far more effect than anything April Glaspie may or may not have said in her meeting with Saddam Hussein.” The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies That Put the White House on Trial and Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity Joseph Wilson (Diplomat to US Iraq Ambassador to Iraq Glaspie)
Propaganda And Lies
"While I was there, I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns. They took the babies out of the incubators, took the incubators and left the children to die on the cold floor. It was horrifying. I could not help but think of my nephew who was born premature and might have died that day as well. After I left the hospital, some of my friends and I distributed flyers condemning the Iraqi invasion until we were warned we might be killed if the Iraqis saw us.
The Iraqis have destroyed everything in Kuwait. They stripped the supermarkets of food, the pharmacies of medicine, the factories of medical supplies, ransacked their houses and tortured neighbors and friends.
I saw and talked to a friend of mine after his torture and release by the Iraqis. He is 22 but he looked as though he could have been an old man. The Iraqis dunked his head into a swimming pool until he almost drowned. They pulled out his fingernails and then played [sic] electric shocks to sensitive private parts of his body. He was lucky to survive.
If an Iraqi soldier is found dead in the neighborhood, they burn to the ground all the houses in the general vicinity and would not let firefighters come until the only ash and rubble was left.
The Iraqis were making fun of President Bush and verbally and physically abusing my family and me on our way out of Kuwait. We only did so because life in Kuwait became unbearable. They have forced us to hide, burn or destroy everything identifying our country and our government.
I want to emphasize that Kuwait is our mother and the Emir our father. We repeated this on the roofs of our houses in Kuwait until the Iraqis began shooting at us, and we shall repeat it again. I am glad I am 15, old enough to remember Kuwait before Saddam Hussein destroyed it and young enough to rebuild it
Thank you." Nayirah testimony, Video
"He said Americans ″are held in direct contravention of international law. Many of them reportedly staked out as human shields near possible military targets, brutality that I don’t believe Adolf Hitler ever participated in anything of that nature."" Bush Says Saddam Even Worse Than Hitler TOM RAUM AP News November 1, 1990
"The United States will be in a box if the Iraqis agree to withdraw unconditionally," said a diplomat who has been following the issue closely. He said it was unlikely that the international coalition sponsoring the war under United Nations authorization would approve further large-scale military action under such circumstances, whatever the view in Washington" PEACE PLAN POSES RISKS FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS By Don Oberdorfer February 21, 1991 The Washington Post
Budget, Arms, Oil, NATO And Other Potential Motivations
"Less than a year after political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sent the defense industry reeling under the threat of dramatic cutbacks, executives and analysts say the crisis in the Persian Gulf has provided military companies with a tiny glimmer of hope.
"If Iraq does not withdraw and things get messy, it will be good for the industry. You will hear less rhetoric from Washington about the peace dividend," said Michael Lauer, an analyst with Kidder, Peabody & Co. in New York" DEFENSE INDUSTRY SEES SPARK OF HOPE August 10, 1990 Washington Post
"The President should be aware that, while most Americans are laboring very hard to support him, a mood of cynicism is just beneath their veneer of respect. Many are claiming that the buildup is little more than a “Pentagon budget drill,” designed to preclude cutbacks of an Army searching for a mission as bases in NATO begin to disappear." In the Gulf, the Danger of a Diplomatic Solution And the Horrors of a Desert War By James Webb.Sept. 23, 1990 NYT (James Webb was Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration)
Damage To The Country, People And Sanctions
"I and the members of my mission were fully conversant with media reports regarding the situation in Iraq and, of course, with the recent WHO/UNICEF report on water, sanitary and health conditions in the Greater Baghdad area. It should, however, be said at once that nothing that we had seen or read had quite prepared us for the particular form of devastation which has now befallen the country. Recent conflict has wrought near-apocalyptic results upon the economic infrastructure of what had been, until January 1991, a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology." United Nations, “Report to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the Immediate Post-crisis Environment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, Dated 20 March 1991,” $/22366 para 8
"Two world renowned child psychologists stated that the children in Iraq were ‘the most traumatized children of war ever described’. Nearly two-thirds of children interviewed believe they will not survive to be adults" Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq: Challenge for U.S. Policy : Hearing Before the International Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, Hearing Held in Washington, DC, November 13, 1991 Page 40
"The strategic bombing of Iraq, described in wartime briefings as a campaign against Baghdad's offensive military capabilities, now appears to have been broader in its purposes and selection of targets.
Amid mounting evidence of Iraq's ruined infrastructure and the painful consequences for ordinary Iraqis, Pentagon officials more readily acknowledge the severe impact of the 43-day air bombardment on Iraq's economic future and civilian population. Their explanations these days of the bombing's goals and methods suggest that the allies, relying on traditional concepts of strategic warfare, sought to achieve some of their military objectives in the Persian Gulf War by disabling Iraqi society at large.
Though many details remain classified, interviews with those involved in the targeting disclose three main contrasts with the administration's earlier portrayal of a campaign aimed solely at Iraq's armed forces and their lines of supply and command. Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed primarily to create postwar leverage over Iraq, not to influence the course of the conflict itself. Planners now say their intent was to destroy or damage valuable facilities that Baghdad could not repair without foreign assistance. Many of the targets in Iraq's Mesopotamian heartland, the list of which grew from about 400 to more than 700 in the course of the war, were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of Baghdad's occupation army in Kuwait. Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society, and thereby compel President Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait without a ground war. They also hoped to incite Iraqi citizens to rise against the Iraqi leader. Because of these goals, damage to civilian structures and interests, invariably described by briefers during the war as "collateral" and unintended, was sometimes neither. The Air Force and Navy "fraggers" who prepared the daily air-tasking orders in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, took great care to avoid dropping explosives directly on civilians -- and were almost certainly more successful than in any previous war -- but they deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society.
The worst civilian suffering, senior officers say, has resulted not from bombs that went astray but from precision-guided weapons that hit exactly where they were aimed -- at electrical plants, oil refineries and transportation networks. Each of these targets was acknowledged during the war, but all the purposes and consequences of their destruction were not divulged.
Among the justifications offered now, particularly by the Air Force in recent briefings, is that Iraqi civilians were not blameless for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. "The definition of innocents gets to be a little bit unclear," said a senior Air Force officer, noting that many Iraqis supported the invasion of Kuwait. "They do live there, and ultimately the people have some control over what goes on in their country."
"When they discuss warfare, a lot of folks tend to think of force on force, soldier A against soldier B," said another officer who played a central role in the air campaign but declined to be named. Strategic bombing, by contrast, strikes against "all those things that allow a nation to sustain itself."
...For critics, this was the war that showed why the indirect effects of bombing must be planned as discriminately as the direct ones. The bombardment may have been precise, they argue, but the results have been felt throughout Iraqi society, and the bombing ultimately may have done as much to harm civilians as soldiers.
Pentagon officials say that military lawyers were present in the air campaign's "Black Hole" planning cell in Riyadh and emphasize that the bombing followed international conventions of war. Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, at a recent breakfast with reporters, said every Iraqi target was "perfectly legitimate" and added, "If I had to do it over again, I would do exactly the same thing."
A growing debate on the air campaign is challenging Cheney's argument on two fronts.
Some critics, including a Harvard public health team and the environmental group Greenpeace, have questioned the morality of the bombing by pointing to its ripple effects on noncombatants.
The Harvard team, for example, reported last month that the lack of electrical power, fuel and key transportation links in Iraq now has led to acute malnutrition and "epidemic" levels of cholera and typhoid. In an estimate not substantively disputed by the Pentagon, the team projected that "at least 170,000 children under five years of age will die in the coming year from the delayed effects" of the bombing" ALLIED AIR WAR STRUCK BROADLY IN IRAQ June 23, 1991 NYT
"deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society. The worst civilian suffering, senior officers say, has resulted not from bombs that went astray but from precision-guided weapons that hit exactly where they were aimed -- at electrical plants, oil refineries and transportation networks. Each of these targets was acknowledged during the war, but all the purposes and consequences of their destruction were not divulged.
Among the justifications offered now, particularly by the Air Force in recent briefings, is that Iraqi civilians were not blameless for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. "The definition of innocents gets to be a little bit unclear," said a senior Air Force officer, noting that many Iraqis supported the invasion of Kuwait. "They do live there, and ultimately the people have some control over what goes on in their country." ALLIED AIR WAR STRUCK BROADLY IN IRAQ June 23, 1991 NYT
"Pentagon officials declined two written requests for a review of the 28 electrical targets and explanations of their specific military relevance.
"People say, 'You didn't recognize that it was going to have an effect on water or sewage,' " said the planning officer. "Well, what were we trying to do with {United Nations-approved economic} sanctions -- help out the Iraqi people? No. What we were doing with the attacks on infrastructure was to accelerate the effect of the sanctions."
Col. John A. Warden III, deputy director of strategy, doctrine and plans for the Air Force, agreed that one purpose of destroying Iraq's electrical grid was that "you have imposed a long-term problem on the leadership that it has to deal with sometime."
"Saddam Hussein cannot restore his own electricity," he said. "He needs help. If there are political objectives that the U.N. coalition has, it can say, 'Saddam, when you agree to do these things, we will allow people to come in and fix your electricity.' It gives us long-term leverage."
Said another Air Force planner: "Big picture, we wanted to let people know, 'Get rid of this guy and we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding. We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that, and we'll fix your electricity.' " ALLIED AIR WAR STRUCK BROADLY IN IRAQ The Washington Post June 23, 1991
Sanctions
"Leslie Stahl: "We have heard that a half million children have died (as a result of sanctions against Iraq). I mean, that is more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you know, is the price worth it?"
Madeleine Albright: "I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it." 60 minutes Interview with Madeline Albright 1996 Clinton's secretary of state, commenting on the sanctions on Iraq
"Mr. Gates, who has been nominated to be Director of Central Intelligence, said of Mr. Hussein, "Iraqis will pay the price while he is in power."
"All possible sanctions will be maintained until he is gone," Mr. Gates continued.
He said Iraq "will be nothing but a pariah state" as long as Mr. Hussein rules and that "Iraqis will not participate in post-crisis political, economic and security arrangements until there is a change in regime." AFTER THE WAR; Bush Links End Of Trading Ban To Hussein Exit NYT May 21, 1991
"Children lie on filthy hospital beds, murmuring in pain as they die of diarrhea and pneumonia. Some of the Arab world's finest artists peddle their work for as little as $12 a painting. A 50-year-old re- tired policeman, victim of a stroke a year ago, limps from merchant to merchant in a food market looking for what he can afford on a pension driven down by inflation to the equivalent of $2 a month, barely enough to buy one chicken. . . . Unable to sell its oil and buy food, medicine and spare parts except under United Nations con- ditions that it refuses to accept, Iraq faces famine and economic collapse… Despite the hardships being heaped on the population, Mr. Hussein, his two sons and potential political heirs, Uday and Qusay, and his Takriti family clan continue to rule Iraq virtually as royalty. Behind the walls of sumptuous palaces and cordons of security men, Mr. Hussein remains invulnerable to public dissent, protected by an intelligence and security apparatus directed by Qusay and a handful of first cousins and other relatives." Baghdad's Burden -- A special report.; Iraq Is Near Economic Ruin But Hussein Appears Secure By Youssef M. Ibrahim NYT Oct. 25, 1994
Calls For The Iraqi People To Rise Up And Regime Change Policy
"But there's another way for the bloodshed to stop. And that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands -- to force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside" Remarks to the American Association for the Advancement of Science 1991-02-15 President George H W Bush - Audio
"And you're asking me if I foresaw the size of the Kurdish refugee problem? The answer is no, I did not. But do I think that the United States should bear guilt because of suggesting that the Iraqi people take matters into their own hands, with the implication being given by some that the United States would be there to support them militarily? That was not true. We never implied that." President George H. W. Bush, April 16, 1991, White House Briefing Min 9:30 (Lie, see above)
"Do I think the answer is now for Saddam Hussein to be kicked out? Absolutely because there will not be -- may I finish,please? -- there will not be normalized relations with the United States, and I think this is true for most coalition partners, until Saddam Hussein is out of there. And we will continue the economic sanctions." President George H. W. Bush, April 16, 1991, White House Briefing Min 9:50
Post Gulf War Bombings
"When U.S. bombs and missiles fell on Iraq on the evening of Dec. 16, one of their principal targets was Saddam Hussein's sleeping quarters on the outskirts of Baghdad. But that was only one of the sites on the military's list of places to bomb in the sprawling Radwaniyah complex adjacent to the now-vacant Saddam International Airport. The targeting list was stunning in its specificity. Bombs were dropped on separate buildings that house secret units of the infamous Special Security Organization (SSO) and the Special Republican Guards (SRG), including the barracks of the 5th Battalion of the 1st Brigade, the 8th Battalion of the 2nd Brigade, the 3rd Artillery Battalion, and the 1st Armored Battalion of the 4th Brigade.
Thanks to the hard work of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), U.S. targeters know a lot more about the Iraqi regime today than they did during the Gulf War in 1991. The United States and Britain now have a diagrammatic understanding of the Iraqi government structure, as well as of the intelligence, security and transport organizations that protect the Iraqi leadership. The same mission folders that UNSCOM put together to inspect specific buildings and offices in its search for concealed Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) became the basis for the targeting folders that missile launchers and pilots used in December.
Welcome to the true Operation Desert Fox.
It is clear from the target list, and from extensive communications with almost a dozen officers and analysts knowledgeable about Desert Fox planning, that the U.S.-British bombing campaign was more than a reflexive reaction to Saddam Hussein's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM's inspectors. The official rationale for Desert Fox may remain the "degrading" of Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction and the "diminishing" of the Iraqi threat to its neighbors. But careful study of the target list tells another story" The Difference Was in the Details Saddam Hussein Iraqi President Saddam Hussein By William M. Arkin Special to The Washington Post Sunday, January 17, 1999; Page B1 (William Arkin, an independent defense analyst, spent two months in Iraq after the Gulf War)