"If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible, although I don’t want to see Hitler victorious in any circumstances." Harvard Crimson, wiki, Politico (No Primary source)
"Actually, at least in more routine operations, case officers most fear the US ambassador and his staff, then restrictive headquarters cables, then curious, gossipy neighbors in the local community, as potential threats to operations. Next would come the local police, then the press. Last of all is the KGB—in my twelve years of case officering I never saw or heard of a situation in which the KGB attacked or obstructed a CIA operation." In Search of Enemies, John Stockwell (Ex-CIA) Page 101
"It isn’t done. If a CIA case officer has a flat tire in the dark of night on a lonely road, he will not hesitate to accept a ride from a KGB officer—likely the two would detour to some bar for a drink together. In fact CIA and KGB officers entertain each other frequently in their homes. The CIA’s files are full of mention of such relationships in almost every African station." In Search of Enemies, John Stockwell (Ex-CIA) Page 238
"The experiment which we tried in Ghana was essentially one of developing the country in co-operation with the world as a whole. Non-alignment meant exactly what it said. We were not hostile to the countries of the socialist world in the way in which the governments of the old colonial territories were. It should be remembered that while Britain pursued at home co-existence with the Soviet Union this was never allowed to extend to British colonial territories. Books on socialism, which were published and circulated freely in Britain, were banned in the British colonial empire, and after Ghana became independent it was assumed abroad that it would continue to follow the same restrictive ideological approach. When we behaved as did the British in their relations with the socialist countries we were accused of being pro-Russian and introducing the most dangerous ideas into Africa." Kwame Nkrumah, Dark Days in Ghana (London, 1968), Page 71,72
"Clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, for example, is not seen … as violating the Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the French Indochina War, or as conflicting with the public policy pronouncements of the various administrations. Clandestine warfare, because it is covert, does not exist as far as treaties and public posture are concerned. Further, secret commitments to other nations are not sensed as infringing on the treaty-making powers of the Senate Because they are not publicly acknowledged." The Pentagon Papers (N.Y. Times edition, 1971)
"Architects of U.S. policy would have to make their case “clearer than the truth,” and “bludgeon the mass mind of top government,” as Secretary of State Dean Acheson … puts it. They do. The new Central Intelligence Agency begins a systematic overstatement of Soviet military expenditures. Magically, the sclerotic Soviet economy is made to hum and climb on U.S. government charts. To Stalin’s horse-drawn army—complete with shoddy equipment, war- torn roads and spurious morale—the Pentagon adds phantom divisions, then attributes invasion scenarios to the new forces for good measure. U.S. officials “exaggerated Soviet capabilities and intentions to such an extent,” says a subsequent study of the archives, “that it is surprising anyone took them seriously.” Fed by somber government claims and reverberating public fear, the U.S. press and people have no trouble." The Life and Death of the Cold War: The Long Battle Between West and East : Russia: U.S. policy-makers seemed proud of their ignorance when it came to the Soviet Union, and this led to many wrong moves. By ROGER MORRIS, LA Times DEC. 29, 1991
"It was perfectly clear to us that if we told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be taken over by the Communists. We therefore had to take the unusual step of using the enemy as a garrison until we could airlift Chinese National [Chiang’s] troops to South China and send Marines to guard the seaports" The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: A Reader's Edition edited by Raymond H. Geselbracht Page 466
"The Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims" FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1943, CHINA
"The Commission has come to the following conclusions. The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objective of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U. S. A. armed forces , using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese army during the second world war. The Commission reached these conclusions, passing from one logical step to another. It did so reluctantly because its members had not been disposed to believe that such an inhuman technique could have been put into execution in the face of its universal condemnation by the peoples of the nations. It is now for all peoples to redouble their efforts to preserve the world from war and prevent the discoveries of science being used for the destruction of humanity" INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES NEW YORK AREA - PART 5 ( SUMMER CAMPS ) HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON UN - AMERICAN ACTIVITIES HOUSE OF.REPRESENTATIVES EIGHTY - FOURTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION JULY 25, 28, 29, AND AUGUST 1, 1955 Page 1652
"Thousands of Americans of Italian origin feel deeply humiliated by the continuous flow of suggestions, advice and pressure put on the Italians, as though they were unable to decide for themselves whom to elect" NYT 8th of April 1948
"Stalin… adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from Pravda or Izvestia" Greece, Spain, and the Southern NATO Strategy: Hearings, Ninety-second congress of The United States Page 465 (Quote from Churchill)
"It is possible that during your stay in Greece you and the Ambassador will come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of your Mission would be enhanced if a reorganization of the Greek Government could be effected. If such a conclusion is reached, it is hoped that you and the Ambassador will be able to bring about such a reorganization indirectly through discreet suggestion and otherwise in such a manner that even the Greek political leaders will have a feeling that the reorganization has been effected largely by themselves and not by pressure from without." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947, THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA, VOLUME V, 868.00/7–1147, To The Secretary of State to Governor Dwight P. Griswold, at Washington From George Marshall
"During the course of your work you and the members of your Mission will from time to time find that certain Greek officials are not, because of incompetence, disagreement with your policies, [Page 223]or for some other reason, extending the type of cooperation which is necessary if the objectives of your Mission are to be achieved. You will find it necessary to effect the removal of these officials. It is important that such a removal be effected quietly and in a manner which will create a minimum amount of resentment from fellow officials and the Greek people. You will probably find it desirable to establish regular channels through which you may present to the Greek Government your views regarding incompetent or uncooperative Greek officials." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947, THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA, VOLUME V, 868.00/7–1147, To The Secretary of State to Governor Dwight P. Griswold, at Washington From George Marshall (Extended quote)
A recently published book brings to light certain considerations that bear on this conclusion. The book to which I refer in "Conversations With Stalin," by Milovan Djilas. On May 14, Djilas was again sent to prison by the Communist government of Yugoslavia. He was convicted of divulging official secrets in the book,“Conversations With Stalin." Have you seen the book?
Mr. BALL. I have a copy which I received only yesterday, and which I haven't yet read.
Senator THURMOND. One of the conversations between Djilas and Stalin related in this book took place on February 10, 1948. Djilas had this to say about Stalin's comments on the Communists 'insurgency then in progress in Greece, and I quote from "Conversations with Stalin":
Do you believe in the success of the uprising in Greece?”
Kardelj replied, “If foreign intervention does not grow, and if serious political and military errors are not made.” Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj’s opinion: “If, if! No, they have no prospect of success at all. What, do you think that Great Britain and the United States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible.” Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies: Hearings Before the United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Forces Page 2837
"I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed (to) Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them [the Philippine Islands] back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died." —William McKinley, President of the United States, 1899, Charles S. Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (Boston, 1916) vol. 2 Page 110-111
"Gave equal rights to Americans in the development of the nation’s natural resources and the operation of its public utilities" NYT 12th of March 1947 (Philippine-US Trade act Passed in congress)
In the Philippines, lumbering interests and major sugar interests have forced tens of thousands of simple, backward villagers to leave areas where they have lived for centuries. When these poor people flee to other areas, it should be quite obvious that they in turn then infringe upon the territorial rights of other villagers or landowners. This creates violent rioting or at least sporadic outbreaks of banditry, that last lowly recourse of dying and terrorized people. Then when the distant government learns of the banditry and rioting, it must offer some safe explanation. The last thing that regional government would want to do would be to say that the huge lumbering or paper interests had driven the people out of their ancestral homeland. In the Philippines it is customary for the local/regional government to get a 10 percent rake-off on all such enterprise and for national politicians to get another 10 percent. So the safe explanation becomes “Communist-inspired subversive insurgency.” The word for this in the Philippines is Huk." COL Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team: The CIA and its Allies in Control of the World Page 103
“But in Korea there seemed to be lack of precise information that could enable the Council to pin responsibility. The thing for the council to do… was to call for a cease-fire, not blame anybody, not ask for a withdrawal of northern troops and set out on an investigation that would bring out the facts for a final decision. Mr Nincitch presented a resolution to that effect and saw it defeated. Only Yugoslavia voted for her proposal" NYT 26th of June 1950 Page 6 Col 5
"He (Soviet Foreign Minister) put forward a motion to hear from representatives from both North and South Korea. The Committee voted him down, 46 to 6 with 7 abstentions and instead it was decided to extend an invitation to South Korea alone." NYT October 1st 1950 Page 4
"While we recognise that the burden of the operation would fall on the United States,
the token forces supplied by these other nations, as in Korea, would lend real moral standing to a venture that otherwise could be made to appear as a brutal example of imperialism. The need was particularly acute because there was no incontrovertible evidence of overt Red Chinese participation in the Indochina conflict" Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 Page 304 (Extended quote)
"probably over 100,000 were killed without any trial whatsoever when ROK soldiers and Counter intelligence Corps recaptured such areas of lefist repute as Yonggwang" Gregory Henderson, Korea : The Politics of the Vortex (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1968) Page 167
"A napalm raid hit the village three or four days ago when the Chinese were holding up the advance, and nowhere in the village have they buried the dead because there is nobody left to do so. … The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they had held when the napalm struck—a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked, holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue crayoned at Mail Order No. 3,811,294 for a $2.98 “bewitching bed jacket—coral”. There must be almost two hundred dead in the tiny hamlet" NYT February 9th 1951 Page 3 Col 2
"The unadorned way that an apparently increasing number of them [American soldiers in Korea] see the situation right now is that the Communists have made important concessions, while the United Nations Command, as they view it, continues to make more and more demands. … The United Nations truce team has created the impression that it switches its stand whenever the Communists indicate that they might go along with it" NYT 12th November 1951
"Whenever we want to subvert any place,” confided Frank Wisner, the CIA’s head of covert operations, to Philby, “we find that the British own an island within easy reach"
"A resolution nationalizing the oil industry was approved by both houses of the Iranian Parliament. On April 28th Dr Mossadegh was elected prime minister and May 1st the nationalization law was passed. The Iranian people, Mossadegh declared, “were opening a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon” Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir Anthony Eden: Full Circle (London, 1960) Page 194
"that there was ‘no substantial evidence’ to indicate that Iran was cooperating with Russia. On the whole, he added, Moslem opposition to communism is predominant, although at times the Iranian Government appears to rely for support on the Tudeh party, which is communistic." NYT 10th of July 1953 page 4
"It seemed to me appropriate that I should deliver a parting message from President Eisenhower. Since he had neglected to send one, I put into words what he must surely be feeling.
“Your Majesty, I received earlier this evening a cable from Washington. President Eisenhower had asked that I convey to you this word: ‘I wish Your Imperial Majesty godspeed. If the Pahlavis and the Roosevelts working together cannot solve this little
problem, then there is no hope anywhere. I have complete faith that you will get this done!’" Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York, 1979) Page 167
"Loy grunted. “And what in heaven’s name do I say?”
“My suggestion would be that you complain about the way Americans here are being harassed. Anonymous telephone calls saying ‘Yankee go home!’ or calling them obscene names. Even if a child picks up the phone the caller just shouts dirty words at him.”
...Loy responded vigorously. “That’s fine. I’ll certainly do it. But what if he asks me about American support for the Shah?”
“I think you should tell him that while Americans do not want to, and will not, get involved in the domestic politics of a foreign country, they are bound to be sympathetic to the man they regard as the legitimate sovereign.”
… The old man shrilled at him: “What are your citizens saying about my country? Why are they criticizing it, trying to work against it, voicing their support for a tyrant who has wisely, if somewhat cravenly, fled to foreign lands? This is most improper. They have no business trying to pressure us in any way, particularly on behalf of a man who is now no more than a rebel!”
Loy could not resist a very pointed reply.
… Loy grew no more “diplomatic” as he proceeded: “My fellow citizens are understandably disturbed at seeing a man whom they have regarded as the friendly chief of a friendly state sent into exile—for reasons which,” he added sharply, “they don’t understand any more than do I.”
Observing with satisfaction the effect of his remarks, Loy went on: “Furthermore I must tell you that my fellow citizens are being harassed most unpleasantly. Not only do they get threatening telephone calls, often answered by their children who are then
subjected to rude words children should not even hear. Not only are they insulted on the streets when going peacefully about their business; in addition to all the verbal aggression they are exposed to, their automobiles are damaged whenever they are left exposed. Parts are stolen, headlights are smashed, tires are deflated”—Mossadegh looked puzzled by that word, but Henderson did not pause to explain it—“and if the
cars are left unlocked their upholstery is cut to pieces.
“Unless this kind of harassment is stopped, Your Excellency, I am going to ask my government to recall all dependents and also all men whose presence here is not required in our own national interest.”
Visibly shaken by the force of Loy’s expression, the old gentleman became confused, almost apologetic.
“I would not want you to do that, Mr. Ambassador. Let me call my police chief. I’ll see that your compatriots are given proper protection.” Before Loy had taken his leave, the police had been called and given their instructions. Later, Loy and I were to agree that this indeed had been a helpful move, encouraging the pro-Shah police force. For the time being, however, I was still restricted—except for a cautious ambassadorial evening visit—to the radio shack. And by the next time I saw Loy there was much else to talk about." Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York, 1979) Page 183-185
By now the crowd of demonstrators, including many uniformed soldiers and police, was streaming past our chancery. Its vanguard had already reached Mossadegh’s house, some half a dozen blocks beyond us. The crackle of rifles, and the boom-thud of an occasional mortar, could clearly be heard… Then a voice—not that of Mohsen—came
on the air. Once again we heard the shout “Zindabad. Shah! Long live the Shah!” And, alternating Farsi and English, our unknown speaker came out with the well-intended lies, or “pre-truths,” which Mohsen had been planning to broadcast.
“The Shah’s instruction that Mossadegh be dismissed has been carried out. The new Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, is now in office. And His Imperial Majesty is on his way home!”
… They were headed, full of the best intentions, for Dr. Mossadegh’s house several blocks away. And in their midst I spotted a figure in full uniform—the general in command of the air force. I remembered the last meeting in John Foster Dulles’ office.
“What about General Guilanshah?” he had asked. I could see again his faint grin at my surprise; I could also remember my reply that I could see no role for the general. Now I damn well could.
He had recognized me at the same time I’d caught sight of him. We fought our way through the mob until we could communicate. He gave me a broad smile.
“There must be something I can do to help. ”
I sought for no explanation of his question but responded quickly, “Damn right there is! Pick up a tank if you can and meet me one block west of here in fifteen minutes. I’ll be in a small black Citroen, and I’ll turn over General Zahedi to your care.” Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (New York, 1979) Page 191-193
Now, when this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis, blankets, boots, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that permitted and created the atmosphere in which they could support the Shah … The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program" Hearings in 1954 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on “The Mutual Security Act of 1954” Page 503, 569-570
"INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN GUATEMALA AND
ITS EFFECT ON PRICE OF IMPORTED COFFEE
Mrs. SMITH of Maine submitted the following resolution (S. Res. 211), which
was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:
Whereas it is reported that the Communist movement has gained such economic
and political strength within the Republic of Guatemala that it now largely dominates
and controls economic and political affairs within that country; and • Whereas it appears that the prices charged by Guatemalan producers for coffee imported into the United States have been drastically increased, and that such increases have been a contributing factor in the establishment of the exorbitant prices now charged consumers for coffee-within the United States: Therefore be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should
(a) direct the appropriate agencies of the Government to conduct promptly such investigation as may be necessary to ascertain
(1) the extent to which the Communist movement now controls economic and political affairs within the Republic of Guatemala, and (2) the extent to which unjustified increases in the price of coffee imported into the United States have been imposed by Guatemala producers; and
(b ) take such action as may be required to exclude from importation into the United
States all coffee originating in the Republic
of Guatemala until such time as he is satisfied that ( 1) the economic and political
affairs of that country no longer are dominated and controlled by the Communist
movement, and (2) the unjustified prices for coffee imposed by producers in that
country have been reduced to reasonable levels" Congressional Record, 8 February 1954 Senator Margaret Chase Smith Page 1475
"the Communist dictatorship” establishing “an outpost on this continent to the detriment of all the American nations" NYT 20th May 1954 Page 18, President Einsenhower
"Colonel Carlos Castillo armas, was provided food and housing on the Fruit Company property just across the Guatemalan border in Honduras and that the invading troops were assembled from… Arbenz was overthrown within a matter of days. The incident even produced some reasonable atrocity photos. I don't know where they came from but somehow we got a hold of some photographs of several dead bodies - some had been castrated - about to be buried in a mass grave. The photos got the widest possible circulation and Arbenz got all the credit. For all I know they could just as easily have been the victims of either side—or of an earthquake. The point is, they were widely accepted for what they were purported to be—victims of communism.” Thomas P. McCann, An American Company: The Tragedy of United Fruit (New York, 1976) Page 60
"During this same period, the CIA put into practice a plan to create an “incident”. Agency planes were dispatched to drop several harmless bombs on Honduran territory. The Honduran government then complained to the UN and the Organization of American States, claiming that the country had been attacked by Guatemalan planes." Quote from book, incident reported in the NYT 24th June 1954 (They did report the CIA did this just the alleged incident)
"My role in Guatemala prior to the revolution was strictly that of a diplomatic observer … The revolution that overthrew the Arbenz government was engineered and instigated by those people in Guatemala who rebelled against the policies and ruthless oppression of the Communist-controlled government." John Peurifoy Ex US Guatemala Ambassador, Communist Aggression in Latin America: Ninth Interim Report ..., Volumes 73-75. By United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Communist Aggression Page 114
"The events in Guatemala] expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system … having gained control of what they call the mass organizations, [the communists] moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program … dictated to the Congress and to the President … Arbenz … was openly manipulated by the leaders of communism … The Guatemalan regime enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia … [the] situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves" Secretary John Foster Dulles Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 83rd congress Volume 100, Part 7, By United States. Congress Page 9622
"Figueres accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of aiding the Somoza movement against him. He claimed that the CIA felt indebted to Somoza for the help he had given in overthrowing the Arbenz regime. He asserted that the same pilots and planes (the F-47) that had participated in the attack upon Guatemala, “afterwards came from Nicaragua and machine-gunned eleven defenseless towns in our territory.” According to Figueres, at the same time that the U.S. Department of State arranged the sale of fighter planes for Costa Rica’s defense, CIA planes and pilots were flying sorties for the rebels" Charles D. Ameringer, Don Pepe, A Political Biography of José Figueres of Costa Rica Page 124-125
"take control of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hamah. The frontier posts with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon would also be captured in order to seal Syria’s borders until the radio stations announced that a new government had taken over under Colonel Kabbani, who would place armored units at key positions throughout Damascus. Once control had been established, Ilyan would inform the civilians he’d selected that they were to form a new government, but in order to avoid leaks none of them would be told until just a week before the coup." Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East By Wilbur Crane Eveland (Ex CIA)
Ben Fenton Fri 26 Sep 2003, The Guardian
"I was shocked. Who, I wondered, had reached this determination of what the Arabs considered a danger? Israel’s army had just invaded Egypt and still occupied all of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. And, had it not been for Russia’s threat to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians, the British, French, and Israeli forces might now be sitting in Cairo, celebrating Nasser’s ignominious fall from power." Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East By Wilbur Crane Eveland (Ex CIA)
"The Central Intelligence Agency for 20 years has made secret annual payments totaling millions of dollars to King Hussein of Jordan, The Washington Post has learned...As justification for the direct cash payments to Hussein, the CIA claimed that Hussein was allowing U.S. intelligence agencies to operate freely in his strategically placed Middle Eastern country. Hussein himself provided intelligence to the CIA and forwarded money from the payments to other government officials who provided intelligence or cooperated with the CIA." CIA Paid Millions to Jordan's King Hussein, The Washington Post, Feb 18th 1977
If leaders of Iraq and Jordan) “felt it necessary to take actions against aggression by the Syrian government, the United States would undertake to expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle Eastern countries and, further, would replace losses as quickly as possible.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961 Page 198
"Abdul Illah, insisted on British participation in anything covert, but the Saudis had severed relations with Britain and refused. As a result, the CIA dealt separately with each: agreeing to fund King Saud’s part in a new area scheme to oppose Nasser and eliminate his influence in Syria; and to the same objective, coordinating in Beirut a covert working group composed of representatives of the British, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese intelligence services.” Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East By Wilbur Crane Eveland (Ex CIA)
"So obvious, were their ‘covert’ gyrations, with British, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese liaison personnel coming and going nightly, that the Egyptian ambassador in Lebanon was reportedly taking bets on when and where the next U.S. coup would take place.” Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East By Wilbur Crane Eveland (Ex CIA)
"we began to feed the State and Defense departments intelligence that no one could deny was a useful contribution to understanding Indonesia. When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels’ plans to reduce Sukarno’s power. This was a method of operation which became the basis of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in the affairs of countries like Chile only after being ordered to do so by … the Special Group. … In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the circumstances. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-1958 was one such instance." Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1976) Page 220-221 (Ex-CIA)
"Actually the theme wasn't something we invented simply by brooding about this obvious vulnerability of Sukarno. There had been reports that a good-looking blond stewardess had been aboard his aircraft everywhere he went in the Soviet Union in 1956. We had a report that this same woman had come to Indonesia with Voroshilov and had been seen several times in the company of Sukarno. This formed the foundation of our flights of fancy. We had, as a matter of fact, considerable success with this theme. It appeared in the press around the world, and when Round Table, the serious British quarterly of inter- national affairs, came to analyze the Indonesian revolt in its March, 1958, issue, it listed Sukarno's being blackmailed by a Soviet female spy as one of the reasons that caused the uprising." Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1976) Page 231
"What our special Sukarno committee was formed to accomplish was the production of a film, or at least, some still photos, showing Sukarno and his Russian girlfriend engaged in his favorite activity. We ourselves were going to produce some proof of our theme—the very films with which the Soviets were blackmailing Sukarno. Movies that in those days were called blue films, which.indeed they were when compared with the full-color, full- length features that have become standard viewing throughout the country today, were acquired for us by CIA's chief of security, Sheffield Edwards, through his close, friendly contact with the police chief of Los Angeles. Los Angeles's supply of blue films suited our purpose, we thought, because they included dark male.subjects, like the Mexican, who might be made to look like Sukarno with a little touching up. The problem was the female partner. They did not use talent in blue films.in Los Angeles in those days that could compare with that of a decade later. We saw no likely candidates for the beautiful blond Soviet agent...One idea we had was to ask the Los Angeles police department to find us a dark and bald male lead. Sukarno.never permitted himself to be photographed without his pitji, the traditional black cap worn by Malayan and Indonesian male Moslems, lest his balding head be seen. We figured he surely didn't wear his pitju in bed. We.thought we would expose his vanity while we were exposing him. We saw a number of bald Chicanos but no Sukarnos. Finally, we decided that we would try to develop us a full-face mask of Sukarno. We planned to ship this out to Los Angeles and ask the police to pay some blue film star to wear it during his big scene" Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1976) Page 214
"Participation in the recruitment effort in Washington was eagerly sought by younger officers on the desk. At least one important part of the process offered them very pleasant duty. Whether the police officers were bent on emulating their national leader or were just guys out for a good time away from home, I can't say. All had an absorbing desire to sleep with a white woman. They were convinced that this would be a different experience from enjoying the little brown maidens at home. So the Washington case officers hauled them off to the Oasis in Baltimore to accomplish this mission. This strippers' dive at Baltimore and Frederick streets offered them quick, direct action." Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1976) Page 232
"I repeat that we are here faced by part of the international Communist conspiracy to set up totalitarian states and to plant their ideas wherever they think the soil will prove fertile. Hon. Members must really make up their minds—and pretty soon—upon which side they are going to take up their position. Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to tolerate the setting up of Communist states in the British Commonwealth, and I have no doubt that, in taking up that position, we have the support of the overwhelming majority of the people of this country behind us." Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons , 22 October 1953, column 2170, speech by Oliver Lyttleton
"The document is headed "Police Headquarters", and then appear the words "Assistant Commissioner of Crime". It then says: I have investigated 19 reports of crimes which occurred between 8th June, 1963 and 21st July, 1963, which include placing explosives in buildings and destroying buildings with explosives and arson. I am of opinion that there is evidence to support a charge of conspiracy contrary to Section 34 of the Criminal Law Offence Ordinance, Chapter 10. It then say: The following persons are involved in these crimes. It deals with a number of explosions and acts of arson which took place in 1963, such as the blowing up of the Transport and Harbours Department office, blowing up the Campbell Ville Government School, arson and fire at the Georgetown ferry stelling, an attempt to demolish by explosives the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, Health and Housing, an attempt to blow up the Central Housing Planning Department, and an attempt to blow up the Education Department in Georgetown. Many of these buildings were demolished. In the case of the Rice Marketing Board a large quantity of dynamite was placed under a wharf where 200 workmen were engaged in loading rice on to a ship.
An interesting point about this document, which was prepared as recently as 11th December, 1963, is that there are 25 people whose names are set down, and in these cases it is not a question of suspicion but the police have formulated charges. I do not want to read the whole of the document. It sets out circumstantial details. The evidence is set out, and it is suggested that there is sufficient evidence of a criminal conspiracy under the Criminal Law Offence Ordinance. Was any action taken about this by the Governor? Were there any detentions? No. Was there any trial? No. One action only was taken. The document was suppressed. At that time the Government in power, or nominally in power, against which these actions were taken was Mr. Jagan's Government.
It is interesting to examine some of the 25 names in the document. One of them is the present Prime Minister, Mr. Burnham. Another is Mr. Graham, now head of the Marketing Division of the Government. Mr. Hamilton Green is 1767the Secretary of the P.N.C., the party now in power. Mr. Llewellyn John is the Minister of Agriculture. Dr. Reid is the Minister of Home Affairs in whose house detonators were found. He is now Minister of Home Affairs. Twelve months before it was suggested that he should be prosecuted for conspiracy, arson and carrying explosives. This is an extraordinary metamorphosis. It is like making Guy Fawkes the Serjeant at Arms of this House. Mr. Richard Ishmail is a large hotel owner, President of the Trades Union Congress and also a supporter of the present Administration." Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons , 4 May 1966, columns 1765-7
"There is an irony which we all recognize in the fact of America urging us all over the world towards colonial freedom except when it approaches her own doorstep.When I was last in America, in May and June of last year, I discussed with many people, including President Kennedy, this particular question which weighs anxiously on their minds. I myself think that their fears are exaggerated. I do not think, for example, that Dr. Jagan himself is a Communist. In any case, it is no part of my argument in support of the Secretary of State that he is. The American attitude seems to me to be dangerous in this respect" Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons , 27 April 1964
It was a small clandestine operation in a little South American country three decades ago. President Kennedy ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to subvert the country's leader. The leader fell, and the C.I.A.'s men quietly left town.
Time passed, and the wheels of history turned. The cold war ended, and with its end the fallen leader was elected President of what is now independent Guyana. United States law says it is time to unseal the secret documents that detail Kennedy's plot against him.
But State Department and C.I.A. officials refuse to release them, saying it is not worth the embarrassment.
Keeping secrets can cause embarrassment too. In June the Clinton Administration prepared to send a new Ambassador to the little country -- apparently unaware that the prospective nominee had helped to undermine the restored leader" New York Times, 30 October 1994
"The story begins in 1953, when British Guiana, an English-speaking colony peopled by the descendants of slaves and laborers from Africa and India, elected its first native-born Prime Minister: Cheddi Jagan, a son of the colonial plantations, an American-educated dentist and an admirer of the works of Karl Marx.
Four months later, Churchill suspended British Guiana's Constitution and ordered its Government dissolved. Dr. Jagan was too leftist for Churchill's taste, though the people of British Guiana liked him.
Dr. Jagan and his wife, the former Janet Rosenberg of Chicago, were freed from jail after the British restored constitutional government, and he was re-elected in 1957 and 1961." New York Times, 30 October 1994
"Though many Presidents have ordered the C.I.A. to undermine foreign leaders, they say, the Jagan papers are a rare smoking gun: a clear written record, without veiled words or plausible denials, of a President's command to depose a Prime Minister… The British, at the suggestion of the Kennedy Administration, delayed their colony's scheduled independence and changed its electoral system in October 1963. Now the electorate had to vote for parties instead of people, and a still popular but politically weakened Dr. Jagan fell from power. Once he fell, the British granted independence to the new republic of Guyana.
For the next 20 years the country was governed by Forbes Burnham -- "as the British described him, an opportunist, racist and demagogue intent only on personal power," to quote from "A Thousand Days." He held power through force and fraud until his death in 1985." New York Times, 30 October 1994
"He ran up a foreign debt of more than $2 billion, a sum more than five times Guyana's gross domestic product. Interest on that debt now consumes 80 percent of the country's revenue and more than half of its foreign earnings.
They made a mistake putting Burnham in," Janet Jagan said. "The regrettable part is that the country went backwards." One of the better-off countries in the region 30 years ago, Guyana today is among the poorest. Its principal export is people." New York Times, 30 October 1994
"Washington, D.C. February 7, 2017 – CIA covert aid to Italy continued well after the agency’s involvement in the 1948 elections – into the early 1960s – averaging around $5 million a year, according to a draft Defense Department historical study published today for the first time by the National Security Archive at The George Washington University. The study, declassified in 2016, focuses on the role of Clare Boothe Luce as ambassador to Italy, 1953-1957. In addition to overseeing a program of covert financial support to centrist Italian governments, she used the awarding of contracts under the Department of Defense Offshore Procurement Program to weaken the Italian Communist Party's hold on labor unions. The author concludes that the Eisenhower administration, faced with the possibility of civil war in Italy or the Communist Party coming to power legally, was "willing to intervene militarily only if the Communists seized power forcibly and then only in concert with other European nations." Nation Security Archive, CIA Covert Aid to Italy Averaged $5 Million Annually from Late 1940s to Early 1960s, Study Finds
"CIA is reported to give $6 million to Anti-Reds in Italy" New York Times , 7 January 1976, p. 1
“We ‘had’ at least one newspaper in every foreign capital at any given time,” one C.I.A. man said, and those that the agency did not own outright or subsidize heavily it infiltrated with paid agents or staff officers who could have stories printed that were useful to the agency and not print those it found detrimental" Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by the C.I.A NYT Dec. 26, 1977
"The President's Special Committee submits recommendations concerning longer range policy and courses of action for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405. It is recommended that the US accept nothing short of military victory , oppose a negotiated settlement at Geneva , pressure the Associated States to continue the war with the US support even if negotiations succeed, and seek participation of other nations . Regardless of the outcome of current operations in Indochina , the US in all prudence should develop a regional defense posture incorporating all the Southeast Asian states. Part II , Special Committee Report ori Southeast Asia , 5 April 1954" United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 9 By the United States. Department of Defense Page XI
"Conduct air operations in support of allied forces in Indochina. The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous" United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 9 By the United States. Department of Defense Page 491
"I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai" Dwight Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 Page 372
“ A network television correspondent said , ' Surely , Arthur , you don't expect the American press to be the handmaidens of the government . ' " ' That's exactly what I expect , ' came the reply . " An agency man raised the problem that had preoccupied Ambassador Taylor and Barry Zorthian - about the credibility of American officials . Responded the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs : " ' Look , if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth , then you're stupid . Did you hear that ? —stupid . ' “ One of the most respected of all the newsmen in Vietnam - a veteran of World War II , the Indochina War and Korea - suggested that Sylvester was being deliberately provocative . Sylvester replied : “ Look , I don't even have to talk to you people . I know how to deal with you through your editors and publishers back in the States . ' “ At this point , the Hon . Arthur Sylvester put his thumbs in his ears , bulged his eyes , stuck out his tongue and wiggled his fingers . “ A correspondent for one of the New York papers began a question . He never got beyond the first few words . Sylvester interrupted : " ' Aw , come on . What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?" HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES EIGHTY - NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION 1966 ON NEWS POLICIES IN VIETNAMESTINO AUGUST 17 AND 31, 1966 Page 66
"John Foster Dulles had called on me in his capacity as Secretary of State, and he had exhausted every argument to persuade me to place Cambodia under the protection of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. I refused … I considered SEATO an aggressive military alliance directed against neighbors whose ideology I did not share but with whom Cambodia had no quarrel. I had made all this quite clear to John Foster, an acidy, arrogant man, but his brother [CIA Director Allen Dulles] soon turned up with a briefcase full of documents “proving” that Cambodia was about to fall victim to “communist aggression” and that the only way to save the country, the monarchy and myself was to accept the protection of SEATO. The “proofs” did not coincide with my own information, and I replied to Allen Dulles as I had replied to John Foster: Cambodia wanted no part of SEATO. We would look after ourselves as neutrals and Buddhists. There was nothing for the secret service chief to do but pack up his dubious documents and leave." Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Wilfred Burchett, My War With The CIA (London, 1974, revised edition) Page 75-6
"It was clear in the White House that the CIA station in Phnom Penh knew the plotters well, probably knew their plans, and did nothing to alert Sihanouk. They informed Washington well in advance of the coup" Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy Page 173 (Part of the National Security Council under Nixon and Kissinger)
"angry resignations of four men from Henry Kissinger’s National Security Council staff, including Roger Morris. (Kissinger labeled the resignations as “the cowardice of the Eastern establishment” Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy Page 174 (Part of the National Security Council under Nixon and Kissinger)
"When I read your question, is there any hope of negotiation with anyone at all? Frankly, I am not sure. I would tend to doubt it because of the ferocity with which this war is being waged. The fact that for 5 years the Khmer Rouge suffered first under our B - 52's and our bombing; second, they fight an enemy which has not been taking prisoners ; third, the fact that some 5,000 to 6,000 were taken north to Hanoi and trained, and we perhaps share the blame because we took Cambodians into South Vietnam and trained them, and I can only tell you my emotional reaction, getting into that country, if I could have found the military or State Department leader who has been the architect of this policy, my instinct would be to string him up . Why they are there and what they have done to the country is greater evil than we have done to any country in the world, and wholly without reason, except for our own benefit to fight against the Vietnamese.” Pete McClosky, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on Supplemental Assistance to Cambodia, 24 February 1975 Page 63-64
"By merely withholding the monthly payment to the troops the United States could create the conditions for toppling any Lao government whose policies it opposed. As it turned out, in fact, the United States used this weapon twice—to bring down the government of one Lao leader and to break the will of another.” Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York, 1967) Page 111-2 (Ex intelligence, Army and Aide)
"Over nine years -- from 1964 to 1973 -- the United States dropped more than two million tons of bombs here in Laos -- more than we dropped on Germany and Japan combined during all of World War II. It made Laos, per person, the most heavily bombed country in history. As one Laotian said, the “bombs fell like rain.” Villages and entire valleys were obliterated. The ancient Plain of Jars was devastated. Countless civilians were killed. And that conflict was another reminder that, whatever the cause, whatever our intentions, war inflicts a terrible toll, especially on innocent men, women and children." The White House Office of the Press Secretary September 06, 2016 Remarks of President Obama to the People of Laos
"Yesterday morning the United States Airforce Command and Control Aircraft that directs American air strikes over Laos left its station. Before flying off to Thailand, the pilot of the plane sent a radio message saying "Good-bye and see you next war.” New York Times, 23 February 1973, Page 11
"On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support for Lumumba in the Congolese Parliament. After losing the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized power by a military coup, on September 14, Lumumba asked the United Nations peace-keeping force for protection. The evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States government. Rather, CIA and high Administration officials continued to view him as a threat. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised and aided Congolese contacts known to have an intent to assassinate Lumumba. The officers also urged the "permanent disposal" of Lumumba by some of these Congolese contacts. Moreover, the CIA opposed reopening Parliament after the coup because of the likelihood that Parliament would return Lumumba to power" Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate), 20 November 1975, Page 16-17
"For your personal information only, the following decisions have been taken in order be in a position to render assistance at appropriate time to anti-Goulart forces if it is decided this should be done.
1. Dispatch of US Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos between April 8 and 13; following three tankers at one day intervals.2
2. Immediate dispatch of naval task force for overt exercises off Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier (expected arrive in area by April 10), four destroyers, two destroyer escorts, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later).3
3. Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light equipment including tear gas4 for mob control for air lift to Sao Paulo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon issuance final orders and would involve 10 cargo planes,5 6 tankers, and 6 fighters.
Unloading of POL by US Navy tankers (item 1) and dispatch of airlift (item 3) would require further development politico-military situation to point where some group having reasonable claim to legitimacy could formally request recognition and aid from us and if possible from other American Republics. Dispatch of tankers from Aruba and of naval task force does not immediately involve us in Brazilian situation and is regarded by us as normal naval exercise." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXXI, SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA; MEXICO
Unlike the many previous anti-Goulart coup groups who have approached us during the past two and one half years, the Castello Branco movement shows prospects of wide support and competent leadership. If our influence is to be brought to bear to help avert a major disaster here—which might make Brazil the China of the 1960s—this is where both I and all my senior advisors believe our support should be placed. We hold this view even should Castello Branco be relieved as Army Chief of Staff… Within the coming week, we will be apprised of their estimates of needed arms through contact between ARMA and Gen. Cintra, righthand man of Castello Branco. POL needs would include the navy fuel now being sought by Byington together with motor fuel and aviation gasoline.
13. Given the absolute uncertainty of timing of a possible trigger incident (which could occur tomorrow or any other day); we recommend (a) that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao Paulo as soon as requirements known and arrangements can be worked out. Best delivery means now apparent to us is unmarked submarine to be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo south of Santos, probably near Iguape or Gananeia. (b) This should be accompanied by POL availabilities (bulk, packaged, or both may be required), also avoiding USG identification, with deliveries to await outbreak active hostilities. Action on this should proceed forthwith.
14. The above two actions might suffice to secure victory for friendly forces without any overt US logistical or military participation, especially if politically covered by prompt US recognition our side as legitimate GOB… To minimize possibilities of a prolonged civil war and secure the adherence of large numbers of band-wagon jumpers, our ability to demonstrate commitment and some show of force with great speed could be crucial. For this purpose and in keeping with our Washington talks March 21, one possibility appears to be the early detachment of a naval task force for maneuvers in south Atlantic, bringing them within a few days’ steaming distance of Santos… Carrier aircraft would be most important for psychological effect…
16. We are meanwhile undertaking complementary measures with our available resources to help strengthen resistance forces. These include covert support for pro-democracy street rallies (next big one being April 2 here in Rio, and others being programmed), discreet passage of word that USG deeply concerned at events, and encouragement democratic and anti-Communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor and student groups, church, and business. We may be requesting modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in near future.
17. I also believe that it would be useful, without entering into detail, for Sec State or Presidential press conference response to indicate concern at reports of economic deterioration and political restlessness in Brazil and importance to future of hemisphere that Brazil, true to its deep-rooted democratic and constitutional traditions, will continue its economic and social progress under representative democracy. We recommend such statement in next few days." FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968, VOLUME XXXI, SOUTH AND CENTRAL AMERICA; MEXICO, 187. Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1964.
"Some of them were so active that they became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution before it took place on April 1. What happened in Brazil on April 1 did not just happen—it was planned—and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders—some of whom were actually trained in our institute—were involved in the revolution, and in the overthrow of the Goulart regime." Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Labor Policies and Programs , Staff Report of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, 15 July 1968, Page 14, American Institute for Free Labour Development (AIFLD), AIFLD executive William Doherty
Senator Gore Ambassador "I am particularly concerned, with the part you may have played, if any, in encouraging, promoting, or causing that overthrow.”
Lincoln Gordon: “The answer to that, senator, is very simple. The movement which overthrew President Goulart was a purely, 100 percent—not 99.44—but 100 percent purely Brazilian movement. Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part in the process whatsoever.” Hearing on the Nomination of Lincoln Gordon to be Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 7 February 1966, Page 44
"The coming to power of the Castelo Branco government in Brazil last April saved that country from an immediate dictatorship which could only have been followed by Communist domination.” Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 , Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 25 February 1965, Page 346, General Andrew O’Meara, head of the US Southern Latin America Command
"Roberto Campos said this week that he would go to Moscow in September to explore the Soviet Union's willingness to provide a major industrial project in Brazil … trade between the two countries was running at $120 million per year." New York Times , 11 July 1965, Page 13 (After the Coup due to claimed communist worries and influence)
"Rather than dwell on the authoritarian aspects of the regime, they emphasize assertions by the Brazilian armed forces that they believe in, and support, representative democracy as an ideal and would return government to civilian control if this could be done without sacrifice to security and development. This withdrawal from the political arena is not seen as occurring in the near future. For that reason they emphasize the continued importance of the military assistance training program as a means of exerting U.S. influence and retaining the current pro-U.S. attitude of the Brazilian armed forces. Possible disadvantages to U.S. interests in being so closely identified with an authoritarian regime are not seen as particularly important." Special Study Mission to Latin America on Military Assistance Training , House Committee on Foreign Affairs Report, 1970 Page 5
U"I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared to do everything that we need to do… we just can't take this one… I'd get right on top of it and stick my neck out a little," Lyndon B Johnson tells George Ball in a telephone call
"In Peru, the Government has already made good progress against guerrilla concentrations, and U.S. trained and supported Peruvian army and air force units have played prominent roles in this counter-guerrilla campaign.” Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations (US Senate), 23 February 1966, Page 38
"Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further: the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and—if necessary—military support.” Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate), 20 November 1975, Page 192
"The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with
nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we’d be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine. … After all, the United States had no moral or legal quarrel with us. We hadn’t given the Cubans anything more than the Americans were giving to their allies. We had the same rights and opportunities as the Americans. Our conduct in the international arena was governed by the same rules and limits as the Americans" The Atlantic The real Cuban Missile Crisis Jan Feb 2013 (couldn't find primary source)
"Between April and November 1956, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps conducted Operation Drop Kick to test the practicality of employing mosquitoes to carry an entomological warfare agent in different ways. The Corps released uninfected female mosquitoes into a cooperative residential area of Savannah, Georgia, and then estimated how many mosquitoes entered houses and bit people. Within a day the mosquitoes had bitten many people. In 1958, the Corps released 600,000 mosquitoes in Avon Park, Florida." Wiki, US Chemical Corps
"Within a period of three years , five serious diseases and epidemics have struck Cuban livestock , crops , and people . These are : swine fever blue mold ( tobacco ) , red rot ( sugar cane ) and hemorrhagic dengue and conjunctivitis . These calamities have caused considerable material and human damage . A serious and well - supported study made by Cuban technicians and scientists with advice from qualified foreign specialists arrived at the conclusion that the dengue virus had been deliberately introduced into Cuba . Analyses revealed that at the time the dengue epidemic occurred in Cuba no African or Southeast Asian country with which we have relations had experienced any epidemic of the Type 2 virus , the one which affected the Cuban population . It was also proven that no Cuban or foreign individual coming from those areas , or from other areas , had been a carrier of the disease . The same results were obtained when the epidemiological situation in the Americas was studied . Whereas virus No. 1 was present in some of these countries and virus No. 4 others , outbreaks of virus No. 2 had not occurred in the Latin American and Caribbean Basin countries since 1979. Virus No. 2 appeared in Cuba suddenly without any logical or natural explanation . Moreover , it is widely known that dengue virus No. 2 is one of those that has been receiving the greatest attention in the U.S. centers that are engaged in developing biological weapons The Government of the Republic of Cuba wishes to call the attention of the United States Department of State to the fact that the use of bacteriological substances against Cuba , encouraged by the United States Central Intelligence Agency , is not a new phenomenon. Actions that fit into this same context are known facts that no one questions and which have even been investigated and acknowledged by the United States Senate itself" Special Report - The Department of StateBy United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication Page 3/655
"a mission to carry some germs to introduce them in Cuba to be used against the Soviets and against the Cuban economy, to begin what was called chemical war, which later on produced results that were not what we had expected, because we thought that it was going to be used against the Soviet forces, and it was used against our own people, and with that we did not agree" Special Report - The Department of StateBy United States. Department of State. Office of Public Communication Page 3/655
"At the time of the attempted Communist coup and military counter-coup [sic] of October 1965, more than 1,200 Indonesian officers including senior military figures, had been trained in the United States. As a result of this experience, numerous friendships and contacts existed between the Indonesian and American military establishments, particularly between members of the two armies. In the post-coup period, when the political situation was still unsettled, the United States, using these existing channels of communication, was able to provide the anti-Communist forces with moral and token material support." Military Assistance Training in East and Southeast Asia , a Staff Report for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 16 February 1971 Page 18
"[Accra CIA Station] was given a generous budget, and maintained intimate contact with the plotters as a coup was hatched. So close was the station’s involvement that it was able to coordinate the recovery of some classified Soviet military equipment by the United States as the coup took place.” John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies (New York, 1978) Page 201
Dan Mitrione - US Uruguayan torture
"To manage the election effort, an electoral committee was established in Washington, consisting of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann the Western Hemisphere Division Chief of the CIA, Desmond Fitzgerald; Ralph Dungan and McGeorge Bundy from the White House; and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four, the branch that has jurisdiction over Chile. This group was in close touch with the State Department Office of Bolivian and Chilean Affairs. In Santiago there was a parallel Election Committee that coordinated U.S. efforts. It included the Deputy Chief of Mission, the CIA Chief of Station, and the heads of the Political and Economic Sections, as well as the Ambassador. The Election Committee in Washington coordinated lines to higher authority and to the field and other agencies. No special task force was established, and the CIA Station in Santiago was temporarily increased by only three officers." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 16
"The groundwork for the election was laid early in 1961 by establishing operational relationships with key political parties and by creating propaganda and organizational mechanisms capable of influencing key sectors of the population. Projects that had been conducted since the 1950's among peasants, slum dwellers, organized, labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of the pre-election covert action." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 14
"The 1964 presidential election was the most prominent example of a large-scale election project. The Central Intelligence Agency spent more than $2.6 million in support of the election of the Christian Democratic 'candidate, in part to prevent the accession to the presidency of Marxist Salvador Allende. More than half of the Christian Democratic candidate's campaign was financed. by the United States, although he was not informed of this assistance." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 9
"In addition to support for political parties, the CIA mounted a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign. Extensive use was made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall painting. It was a “scare campaign”, which relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads and was directed especially to women. Hundreds of thousands of copies of the anti-communist pastoral letter of Pope Pius XI were distributed by Christian Democratic organizations. They carried the designation, “printed privately by citizens without political affiliation, in order more broadly to disseminate its content.” “Disinformation” and “black propaganda”—material which purported to originate from another source, such as the Chilean Communist Party—were used as well." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 15
"The propaganda campaign was enormous. During the first week of intensive propaganda activity (the third week of June 1964), a CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts five times daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By the end of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the provinces, 26 weekly “commentary” programs, and distributed 3,000 posters daily." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 15-16
"In addition to buying propaganda piecemeal, the [CIA] Station often purchased it wholesale by subsidizing Chilean media organizations friendly to the United States. Doing so was propaganda writ large. Instead of placing individual items, the CIA supported—or even founded—friendly media outlets which might not have existed in the absence of Agency support. From 1953 through 1970 in Chile, the Station subsidized wire services, magazines written for intellectual circles, and a right-wing weekly newspaper." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 8
"The CIA regards the anti-communist scare campaign as the most effective activity undertaken by the U.S. on behalf of the Christian Democratic candidate." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 16
"The 1970 elections marked the fourth time Salvador Allende had been the presidential candidate of the Chilean left. His personality and his program were familiar to Chilean voters. His platform was similar in all three elections: efforts to redistribute income and reshape the Chilean economy, beginning with the nationalization of major industries, especially the copper companies; greatly expanded agrarian reform; and expanded relations with socialist and communist countries." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 5
"Wresting control of Chilean university student organizations from the communists; •Supporting a women’s group active in Chilean political and intellectual life; •Combatting the communist-dominated Central Unica de Trabajadores Chilenos (CUTCh) and supporting democratic [i.e., anti-communist] labor groups; and, •Exploiting a civic action front group to combat communist influence within cultural and intellectual circles." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 9
"MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
ON CHILE AT 1525 SEPT 15, ’70
PRESENT: JOHN MITCHELL + HENRY KISSINGER
1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job—best men we have
"On September 4, 1970, Allende won a plurality in Chile's presidential election. Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean Constitution required that a, joint session of its Congress decide between the first- and second-place finishers. The date set for the congressiohal session was October 24, 1970. The reaction in Washington to Allende's plurality victory was.immediate. The-40 Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss what action should be taken prior to the October 24 congressional vote. On September 15, President Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States and instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the Presidency. Following the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. 3 Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including political, economic and propaganda activities. These activities were designed to induce Allende's opponents in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed toward actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende" Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 23
"On September 29, 1970, the 40 Committee met. It was agreed that the Frei gambit had been overtaken by events and was dead. The "second-best option"-the cabinet resigning and being replaced with a military cabinet-was also deemed dead. The point was then made that there would probably be no military action unless economic pressures could be brought to bear on Chile. It was agreed that an attempt would be made to have American business take steps in line with the U.S. government's desire for immediate economic action. The economic offensive against Chile, undertaken as a part of Track I, was intended to demonstrate the foreign economic reaction to Allende's accession to power, as well as to preview the future consequences of his regime. Generally, the 40 Committee approved cutting off all credits, pressuring firms to curtail investment in Chile and approaching other nations to cooperate in this venture. These actions of the 40 Committee, and the establishment of an interagency working group to coordinate overt economic activities towards Chile (composed of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division Chief and representatives from State, the NSC, and Treasury), adversely affected the Chilean economy; a. major financial panic ensued. However, U.S. efforts to generate an economic crisis did not have the desired impact on the October 24 vote, nor did they stimulate a military intervention to prevent Allende's accession." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 25
"The Ambassador was also authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the congressional election on October 24." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 26
"Third, special intelligence and "inside".' briefings were given to U.S.journalists, at their request.One Time cover story was considered particularly noteworthy. According to CIA documents, the Time correspondent in Chile apparently had accepted Allende's protestations of moderation and constitutionality at face value. Briefings requested by Time and provided by the CIA in Washington resulted in a change in the basic thrust of the Time story on Allende's September 4 victory and in the timing of that story. A few statistics convey the magnitude of the CIA's propaganda campaign mounted during the six-week interim period in the Latin American and European media. According to the CIA, partial returns showed that 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials, and similar items directly resulted from Agency activity. The Agency had no way to measure the scope of the multiplier effective, how much its "induced" news focused media interest on the Chilean issues and stimulated additional coverage-but concluded that its contribution was both substantial and significant." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 25
"In response to criticisms of El Mercurio by candidate Allende, the CIA, through its covert action resources, orchestrated cables of support and protest from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international press association, and world press coverage of the association's protest. In addition, journalists-agents and otherwise-traveled to Chile for on-the-scene reporting. By September 28, the CIA had agents who were journalists from ten different countries in or en route to Chile.This group was supplemented by eight more journalists from five countries under the direction of high-level agents who were, for the most part, in managerial capacities in the media field." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 24
"A Coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be [the military’s] claim to a coup to save Chile from communism… You may wish to include a variety of themes in justification for a coup to the military for their use. These could include... Firm intel[ligence] that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state … With appropriate military contact can determine how to “discover” intel[ligence] report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros [the police]." Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 20 November 1975, Page 234, A cable sent from CIA headquarters to Santiago on 19 October
"The Agencies task was then to overcome the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military” Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 20 November 1975, Page 240
"United States foreign economic policy toward Allende's government.was articulated at the highest levels of the U.S. government, and coordinated by interagency task forces. The policy was clearly framed during the Track II period. Richard Helms' notes from his Septem- ber 15, 1970, meeting with President Nixon, the meeting which initiated Track II, contain the indication: "Make the economy scream." A week later Ambassador Korry reported telling Frei, through his Defense Minister, that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach Chile under Allende." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 33
"The pattern of U.S. deliberations suggests a careful distinction between supporting the opposition parties and funding private sector groups trying to bring about a military coup. However, given turbulent conditions in Chile,the interconnections among the CIA-sup- ported political parties, the various militant trade - associations (gremios) and paramilitary groups prone to terrorism and violent disruption were many. The CIA was aware that links between these groups and the political parties made clear distinctions difficult. The most prominent of the right-wing paramilitary groups was Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty), which formed following Allende's September 4 election, during so-called Track II. The CIA provided Patriat y Libertad with $38,500 through a third party during the Track II period, in an effort to create tension and a possible pretext for intervention by the Chilean military. After Allende took office, the CIA occasionally provided the group small sums through third parties for demonstrations or specific propaganda activity. Those disbursements, about seven thousand dollars in total, ended-in 1971. It is possible that CIA funds given to political parties reached Patria y Libertad and a similar group, the Rolando Matus Brigade, given the close ties between the parties and these organizations." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 31
"Intelligence reporting on coup plotting reached tivo peak periods, one in the last week of June 1973 and the other during the end of August and the first two weeks in September. It is clear the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July. August, and September 1973. The CIA's information-gathering efforts with regard to the Chilean military included activity which went beyond the mere collection of information. More generally, those efforts must be viewed in the context of United States opposition, overt and covert, to the Allende government. They put the United States Government in contact with those Chileans who sought a military alternative to the Allende presidency." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 39
"A 1972 Chile NIE focused on the Soviet attitude to the Allende regime and noted that Soviet overtures to Allende had thus far been characterized by caution and restraint. This was, in part, due to Soviet reluctance to antagonize the U.S. and, more importantly, a Soviet desire to avoid with Allende the type of open-ended commitment for aid that they had entered into with Castro. A 1972 Intelligence. Note, prepared by the State Depaitment, stated that a Soviet-Chilean communique, issued following Allende's December visit to the USSR, reflected Moscow's decision to continue a cautious policy toward Chile and to avoid a major open-ended commitment of aid-to. Allende. According to the Intelligence Note, the Soviets apparently advised Allende to negotiate his differences with the U.S." Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973 , a Staff Report of The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 18 December 1975, Page 47
"1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.
2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.
3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:
a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS [Organization of American States], and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. …
b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S and a definite psychological advantage for the Marxist idea" Interim Report: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (US Senate) 20 November 1975, Page 229, A CIA study of 7 September 1970
"Then listen to me, Mr. Ambassador,” said the President of the United States, “fuck your Parliament and your Constitution. America is an elephant. Cyprus is a flea. If these two fleas continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant’s trunk, whacked good. … We pay a lot of good American dollars to the Greeks, Mr. Ambassador. If your Prime Minister gives me talk about Democracy, Parliament and Constitutions, he, his Parliament and his Constitution may not last very long.” Philip Deane Gigantes(Secretary-General to King Constantine II of Greece), I Should Have Died (Atheneum, New York, 1977) Page 113-114
CIA Chief-of-Station in Athens, John Maury, had “worked in behalf of the palace in 1965. He helped King Constantine buy Center Union Deputies so that the George Papandreou Government was toppled.” NYT August 2nd 1974 Page 3 Col 1
"Your Excellency, having always believed in the peaceful solution of disputes including those between Iran and Iraq, we are pleased to see that their two countries have come to some agreement … However, our hearts bleed to see that an immediate byproduct of their agreement is the destruction of our defenseless people … Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence from everyone. We feel your Excellency that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people who have committed themselves to your country’s policy." 278
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, VOLUME XXVII, IRAN; IRAQ, 1973–1976, 278. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger 1
Some 200,000 Kurds escaped into Iran, of whom 40,000 were forcibly returned to Iraq. Appeals for humanitarian assistance and for political asylum in the United States were ignored. The last message recorded in the report was an April 10, 1975, cable from the CIA station chief in Tehran to Colby, saying: "If senior Americans like Kissinger who are aware of their relationship do nothing to help the Kurds in their present extremity, we may be sure that they will not lie down quietly to be buried without telling their story to the world. Hence, even if nobody in the State Department or Dr. Kissinger cares what happens to the Kurds, they had better do something to help them, if only in USG and administration interest." The report tells what happened next: "Help never arrived." It quotes a "high U.S. official" as having remarked to the committee's staff, "Covert action should not be confused with missionary work." 1975 BACKGROUND TO BETRAYAL. April 7, 1991 The Washington Post
"Mr Colby: They are all independents. They are all for black Africa. They are all for some fuzzy kind of social system, you know, without really much articulation, but some sort of let’s not be exploited by the capitalist nations…
Mr Aspin: Why are the Chinsease backing the moderate group
Mr Colby: Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer.
Mr Aspin: It sounds like that is why we are doing it.
Mr Colby: It is” Hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence Report
"Later events have suggested that this infusion of US aid [the $300,000], unprecedented and massive in the underdeveloped colony, may have panicked the Soviets into arming their MPLA clients” Hearings before the House Select Committee on Intelligence Report
"Although the United States has supported the FNLA in Angola for 17 years, it is virtually impossible to find an American official, scholar or journalist, who is familiar with that party, who will testify positively about its organization or leadership. After a debate with a senior State Department official at the end of the Angolan civil war, I asked him why the United States ever bet on the FNLA. He replied, “I’ll be damned if I know; I have never seen a single report or memo which suggests that the FNLA has any organization, solid leaders, or an ideology which we could count on.” Even foreign leaders who have supported Holden Roberto, such as General Mobutu, agree with that assessment. When asked by a visiting U.S. Senator if he thought Roberto would make a good leader for Angola, Mobutu replied, “Hell no!” United States-Angolan relations Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on International Relations, 25 May 1978, Page 7
"similar assurances given concerning Chile flashed a little ominously across my mind.” Michael Manley ( Ex Jamaican PM), Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery (London, 1982) Page 116 (Concerning Kissingres commments about no covert action being taken against Jamaica)
" I let Kissinger know Jamaica had decided to support the Cuban army presence in Angola because we were satisfied that they were there because of the South African invasion … I never heard another word about the hundred million dollar trade credit.” Michael Manley ( Ex Jamaican PM), Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery (London, 1982) Page 116-117
"The US Embassy in Kingston was increased. Seven new staffers were flown in. Yet all aid to Jamaica suddenly slowed to a virtual halt. The pipelines suddenly became clogged. Economic co-operation contracted as the embassy expanded" Michael Manley ( Ex Jamaican PM), Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery (London, 1982) Page 117
"The Jamaican establishment had mastered the ways of destabilization. It knew how to use fact and create fiction for maximum effect. We do not know what was the part played by the CIA in the last year. By then it may not have mattered because the Gleaner and the JLP had clearly reached postgraduate level" Michael Manley ( Ex Jamaican PM), Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery (London, 1982) Page 199-200
''The United States has chosen to exercise its right of self-defense,'' he said. ''It is our hope this action will pre-empt and discourage Libyan attacks against innocent civilians in the future.'' PLOTS ON GLOBAL SCALE CHARGED, The New York Times, April 15, 1986
"The Europeans will ask for hard evidence [against Libya] and we won't have any. It will look like we’re crying wolf once again." The NYT 27th of August 1986 Page 7
"I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been on several occasions … shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua … I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any other Central American republic. Nevertheless, it must be said, that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good Government in Nicaragua at the present time … The United States cannot, therefore, fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influence or by any foreign power." New York Times , 11 January 1927 Page 1-2
"Members of Congress and other Government officials say many reports of abuses by Nicaraguan rebels against civilians have come to their attention recently as a result of Congressional investigations of the C.I.A.'s manual on guerrilla warfare.Present and former rebel leaders said in interviews over the last few weeks that some of their guerrillas had been guilty of atrocities. The leaders said they deplored the acts, and they contended that they had evidence that the Sandinistas were guilty of the same kinds of abuses…. Evidence About Crimes
In testimony to the House Select Committee on Intelligence this month, the members of Congress and other sources said, Central Intelligence Agency officials and others presented evidence that the United States-backed rebels had raped, tortured and killed unarmed civilians, including children… The reports have included accounts about groups of civilians, including women and children, who were burned, dismembered, blinded or beheaded, the sources said…. The manual advised rebels to kidnap Sandinistas, to ''neutralize'' selected Government officals, to blackmail ordinary citizens so they would be forced to join the rebel cause, and to hire criminals who would arrange the shooting deaths of fellow rebels so they would become martyrs. The manual also included advice on political propogandizing intended to persuade Nicaraguans to become rebel sympathizers. Behavior Said to Improve" NICARAGUA REBELS ACCUSED OF ABUSES, The New York Times Dec. 27 1984
"The 44-page booklet, titled ''Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,'' is a primer on insurgency. Most activity of this sort in Nicaragua has been paid for by the United States through the C.I.A.
The primer explains how to kidnap and kill officials, blow up public buildings and blackmail ordinary citizens… Destroy the military or police installations and remove survivors to a public place.''
- ''Cut all outside lines of communication.''
- ''Establish a public tribunal'' where the guerrillas ''shame, ridicule and humiliate'' Sandinistas and sympathizers, ''shouting slogans and jeers.''
- Make ''courtesy visits'' to the town's ''prominent people, such as doctors, priests and teachers.''
If ''it becomes necessary'' to shoot a citizen who is ''trying to leave the town,'' guerrillas should explain that ''he was an enemy of the people'' who would have ''alerted the enemy'' so that the Sandinistas could ''carry out acts of reprisals, such as rapes, pillage, destuction, captures, etc.'' 'Neutralizing' Public Officials
The final lesson in the armed propaganda chapter, titled ''Selective Use of Violence,'' involves ''neutralizing'' selected public officials. The lesson stresses that ''it is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected, so that they will be present and take part in the act.''
After the official is publicly ''neutralized,'' guerrillas should offer ''extensive explanation'' of ''why it was necessary for the good of the people'' and then ''choose carefully'' the person ''who will replace the target.''
In Chapter 3, guerrillas are taught the function of ''armed propaganda teams.'' These are recruiters who visit villages to ''exploit the socio-political weaknesses in the target society.''
At first, each team member should be ''courteous and humble'' and should ''mix in with the community,'' attending birthdays, parties and funerals. If ''one or two men'' are hostile, that ''can be overcome by eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective manner.''... When the uprising occurs, ''professional criminals should be hired to carry out selective jobs,'' such as ''taking the demonstrators to a confrontation with the authorities to bring about uprisings and shootings that will cause the death of one or more people to create a martyr for the cause… When the ''concentration reaches its highest level of euphoria or popular discontent,'' the guerrilla commander, watching from a high vantage point, will order his men to begin chanting anti-Sandinista slogans. The commander ''can change slogans'' as the rioting progresses ''and eventually incite violence if he wishes.''
That will give the impression that there are many guerrillas and that ''they have a large popular backing.'' C.I.A. PRIMER TELLS NICARAGUAN REBELS HOW TO KILL, The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1984
“The Administration’s objections to the treaty reinforce my belief that it’s never had any real interest in a negotiated settlement." Michael Barnes, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, NYT October 3rd 1984 Page 3, Contadora group if Mexico, Panama, Colombia and Venezuela treaty about stability in Central America (Nicaragua agreed so sign, US rejected the peace treaty)
The Reagan Administration, while publicly criticizing the Nov. 4 elections in Nicaragua as ''a sham,'' has privately argued against the participation of the leading opposition candidate for fear his involvement would legitimize the electoral process, according to some senior Administration officials.
Since May, when American policy toward the election was formed, the Administration has wanted the opposition candidate, Arturo Jose Cruz, either not to enter the race or, if he did, to withdraw before the election, claiming the conditions were unfair, the officials said.
''The Administration never contemplated letting Cruz stay in the race,'' one official said, ''because then the Sandinistas could justifiably claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to oppose the Nicaraguan Government.''...
Several Administration officials who are familiar with the Administration’s activities in Nicaragua said the Central Intelligence Agency had worked with some of Mr. Cruz’s supporters to insure that they would object to any potential agreement for his participation in the election" KEY AIDES DISPUTE U.S. ROLE IN NICARAGUAN VOTE NYT, Oct. 21, 1984
"A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA," agrees Weinstein. The biggest difference is that when such activities are done overtly, the flap potential is close to zero. Openness is its own protection" The Washington Post INNOCENCE ABROAD: THE NEW WORLD OF SPYLESS COUPS, September 22, 1991
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
NED funding too Nicaraguan Opposition parties - October 1st 1989- September 30th 1990 Annual report Page 43
"Q. -- -- and also, is it really worth it to send people to their death for this, to get Noriega?
The President. We had some estimates, Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International], on the casualties ahead of time, but not in numbers. I mean, it was more general: Look, Mr. President, no way can you do an operation this large and not have American casualties. So, the Defense Department was very up front with us about that, and every human life is precious. And yet I have to answer: Yes, it has been worth it." The President's News Conference
"We have to put a shingle outside our door saying, ‘Superpower lives here’.” THE CONVERSION OF GEN. POWELL by December 21, 1989
"From Mexico to Argentina, Latin American governments today roundly condemned the use of force by the United States against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama.
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela and Peru criticized the action as interference in the sovereign affairs of a fellow American nation.
Nicaragua placed its troops on alert, Peru recalled its Ambassador to the United States and Venezuela said it would not recognize the new Government of Guillermo Endara until United States troops were withdrawn.
Leftist groups in Argentina, Uruguay and Mexico planned public rallies to protest the move. United States diplomatic employees across the continent were instructed to be on the alert for anti-American demonstrations. 'Vehement Appeal' by Brazil" Fighting in Panama: Latin America; U.S. Denounced by Nations Touchy About Intervention, The New York Times Dec. 21, 1989
"GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. EnvoyThe New York Times Sept. 23, 1990
"Mr Kelly: We have no defense treaty relationship with any Gulf country. That is clear. We support the security and independence of friendly states in the region. Ever since the Truman administration, we have maintained Naval forces in the Gulf because of our interest in stability in that region. We are calling for a peaceful resolution of any differences in that area and we hope and trust and believe that the sovereignty of every state in the Gulf ought to be respected.
Mr. HAMILTION: Do we have a commitment to our friends in the Gulf in the event that they are engaged in oil or territorial disputes with their neighbors ?
Mr. KELLY: As I said, Mr. Chairman, we have no defense treaty relationships with any of the countries. We have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes or on internal OPEC deliberations, but we have certainly, as have all administrations, resoundingly called for the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences in the area.
Mr. HAMILTON: If Iraq, for example, charged across the border into Kuwait, for whatever reason, what would be our position with regard to the use of U.S. forces ?
Mr. KELLY: That, Mr. Chairman, is a hypothetical or a contingency, the kind of which I can't get into. Suffice it to say we would be extremely concerned, but I cannot get into the realm of '' what if answers.
Mr. HAMILTON: In that circumstance, it is correct to say, however, that we do not have a treaty commitment which would obligate us to engage U.S. forces ?
Mr. KELLY: That is correct.
Mr. HAMILTON: That is correct, is it not ?
Mr. KELLY: That is correct , sir ..” Developments in the Middle East, July 1990: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, July 31, 1990, Volume 4 Page 14
"We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level." CIA Says Iraq’s Kuwait Document Won’t Wash : Intrigue: It describes a meeting that never took place, U.S. says. Baghdad cited the paper as proof of a conspiracy. LA Times NOV. 1, 1990
"When a reporter asked Mashat to assess why the memo seemed to run directly opposite to the thrust of Glaspie’s meeting with Hussein, the ambassador said that the Glaspie meeting “is part and parcel of the setup.” Critics of the State Department have charged that Glaspie’s message, delivered on the instructions of her superiors, gave a “green light” to the Iraqi aggression" CIA Says Iraq’s Kuwait Document Won’t Wash : Intrigue: It describes a meeting that never took place, U.S. says. Baghdad cited the paper as proof of a conspiracy. LA Times NOV. 1, 1990
"As Iraqi forces massed along Kuwait's border on Aug. 1, a Central Intelligence Agency analyst named Charlie Allen walked into the offices of the National Security Council's Middle East staff.
"This is your final warning," he is reliably said to have told them. Iraq, he said, would invade Kuwait by day's end.
It was not the first time that Mr. Allen, a 32-year C.I.A. veteran with the ominous-sounding title of national intelligence officer for warning, had sounded the Kuwait alarm. Until the last hours of Iraq's sword-rattling, when a handful of others joined him, Mr. Allen had been the leading doomsayer among analysts tracking Iraq's military preparations. For Mr. Allen, associates say, shunning the beaten path is standard fare.
So, apparently, is what happened next. His forecast was disregarded, and top White House and Pentagon officials were surprised at home when Iraq marched into Kuwait on the morning of Aug. 2." Washington at Work; C.I.A. Sidelines Its Gulf Cassandra NYT Jan. 24, 1991
"Less than a year after political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sent the defense industry reeling under the threat of dramatic cutbacks, executives and analysts say the crisis in the Persian Gulf has provided military companies with a tiny glimmer of hope.
"If Iraq does not withdraw and things get messy, it will be good for the industry. You will hear less rhetoric from Washington about the peace dividend," said Michael Lauer, an analyst with Kidder, Peabody & Co. in New York" DEFENSE INDUSTRY SEES SPARK OF HOPE August 10, 1990 Washington Post
"The President should be aware that, while most Americans are laboring very hard to support him, a mood of cynicism is just beneath their veneer of respect. Many are claiming that the buildup is little more than a “Pentagon budget drill,” designed to preclude cutbacks of an Army searching for a mission as bases in NATO begin to disappear." In the Gulf, the Danger of a Diplomatic Solution And the Horrors of a Desert War By James Webb.Sept. 23, 1990 NYT (James Webb was Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan Administration)
"Two world renowned child psychologists stated that the children in Iraq were ‘the most traumatized children of war ever described’. Nearly two-thirds of children interviewed believe they will not survive to be adults" Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq: Challenge for U.S. Policy : Hearing Before the International Task Force of the Select Committee on Hunger, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, Hearing Held in Washington, DC, November 13, 1991 Page 40
"The strategic bombing of Iraq, described in wartime briefings as a campaign against Baghdad's offensive military capabilities, now appears to have been broader in its purposes and selection of targets.
Amid mounting evidence of Iraq's ruined infrastructure and the painful consequences for ordinary Iraqis, Pentagon officials more readily acknowledge the severe impact of the 43-day air bombardment on Iraq's economic future and civilian population. Their explanations these days of the bombing's goals and methods suggest that the allies, relying on traditional concepts of strategic warfare, sought to achieve some of their military objectives in the Persian Gulf War by disabling Iraqi society at large.
Though many details remain classified, interviews with those involved in the targeting disclose three main contrasts with the administration's earlier portrayal of a campaign aimed solely at Iraq's armed forces and their lines of supply and command. Some targets, especially late in the war, were bombed primarily to create postwar leverage over Iraq, not to influence the course of the conflict itself. Planners now say their intent was to destroy or damage valuable facilities that Baghdad could not repair without foreign assistance. Many of the targets in Iraq's Mesopotamian heartland, the list of which grew from about 400 to more than 700 in the course of the war, were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the military defeat of Baghdad's occupation army in Kuwait. Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society, and thereby compel President Saddam Hussein to withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait without a ground war. They also hoped to incite Iraqi citizens to rise against the Iraqi leader. Because of these goals, damage to civilian structures and interests, invariably described by briefers during the war as "collateral" and unintended, was sometimes neither. The Air Force and Navy "fraggers" who prepared the daily air-tasking orders in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, took great care to avoid dropping explosives directly on civilians -- and were almost certainly more successful than in any previous war -- but they deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society.
The worst civilian suffering, senior officers say, has resulted not from bombs that went astray but from precision-guided weapons that hit exactly where they were aimed -- at electrical plants, oil refineries and transportation networks. Each of these targets was acknowledged during the war, but all the purposes and consequences of their destruction were not divulged.
Among the justifications offered now, particularly by the Air Force in recent briefings, is that Iraqi civilians were not blameless for Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. "The definition of innocents gets to be a little bit unclear," said a senior Air Force officer, noting that many Iraqis supported the invasion of Kuwait. "They do live there, and ultimately the people have some control over what goes on in their country."
"When they discuss warfare, a lot of folks tend to think of force on force, soldier A against soldier B," said another officer who played a central role in the air campaign but declined to be named. Strategic bombing, by contrast, strikes against "all those things that allow a nation to sustain itself."
...For critics, this was the war that showed why the indirect effects of bombing must be planned as discriminately as the direct ones. The bombardment may have been precise, they argue, but the results have been felt throughout Iraqi society, and the bombing ultimately may have done as much to harm civilians as soldiers.
Pentagon officials say that military lawyers were present in the air campaign's "Black Hole" planning cell in Riyadh and emphasize that the bombing followed international conventions of war. Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, at a recent breakfast with reporters, said every Iraqi target was "perfectly legitimate" and added, "If I had to do it over again, I would do exactly the same thing."
A growing debate on the air campaign is challenging Cheney's argument on two fronts.
Some critics, including a Harvard public health team and the environmental group Greenpeace, have questioned the morality of the bombing by pointing to its ripple effects on noncombatants.
The Harvard team, for example, reported last month that the lack of electrical power, fuel and key transportation links in Iraq now has led to acute malnutrition and "epidemic" levels of cholera and typhoid. In an estimate not substantively disputed by the Pentagon, the team projected that "at least 170,000 children under five years of age will die in the coming year from the delayed effects" of the bombing" ALLIED AIR WAR STRUCK BROADLY IN IRAQ June 23, 1991 NYT
"The entry of our troops into Afghanistan would outrage the international community, triggering a string of extremely negative consequences in many different areas. Our common enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet troops appear in Afghanistan. This will give them the excuse they need to send armed bands into the country." SECRET MEMOS TRACE KREMLIN'S MARCH TO WAR Washington Post 15, 1992
"There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one … I have a slight obsession with it, because of Vietnam. I thought the Soviets ought to get a dose of it … I’ve been of the opinion that this money was better spent to hurt our adversaries than other money in the Defense Department budget" Rep Charles Wilson Texas U.S. Covert Aid to Afghans on the Rise Washington Post January 13, 1985
"Land reform attempts undermined their village chiefs. Portraits of Lenin threatened their religious leaders. But it was the Kabul revolutionary Government’s granting of new rights to women that pushed orthodox Moslem men in the Pashtoon villages of eastern Afghanistan into picking up their guns. … “The government said our women had to attend meetings and our children had to go to schools. This threatens our religion. We had to fight.” … “The government imposed various ordinances allowing women freedom to marry anyone they chose without their parents’ consent.” Afghans Resist New Rights for Women; Attacks in Response to Changes Portraits of Lenin Distributed Workers and Troops Surrounded The New York Times Feb. 9, 1980
"to halt the infiltration into the Americas, by terrorists and by outside interference, and those who aren’t just aiming at El Salvador but, I think, are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South America and, I’m sure, eventually North America.” 7th of March 1981
"I asked why the guerrillas were in the hills "Fifty years of lies, fifty years of injustice, fifty years of frustration. This is a history of people starving to death, living in misery. For fifty years the same people had all the power, all the money, all the jobs, all the education, all the opportunities" Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador Page 24 speaking to José Napoleón Duarte (He led the subsequent civil-military Junta from 1980 to 1982. He was then elected president in 1984)
"In El Salvador, American aid was used for police training in the 1950’s and 1960’s and many officers in the three branches of the police later became leaders of the right-wing death squads that killed tens of thousands of people in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s." SALVADOR DIVIDED OVER AID TO POLICE New York Times , 22 October 1987
"Proclaiming a “political revolution,” Aristide, 37, has injected a spirit of hope and honesty into the affairs of government, a radical departure after decades of official venality under the Duvalier family dictatorship and a series of military strongmen. Declaring that his $10,000 monthly salary is “not just a scandal, but a crime”, Aristide announced on television that he would donate his paychecks to charity." HAITI'S POVERTY TEMPERS VIEW OF PRESIDENT-PRIEST Washington Post June 6, 1991
"Haitians suffered frequent human rights abuses throughout 1992, including extra-judicial killings by security forces, disappearances, beatings and other mistreatment of detainees and prisoners, arbitrary arrests and detention and executive interference with the judicial process." Haitian Asylum-seekers: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 3663, H.R. 4114, and H.R. 4264, June 15, 1994 Page 173, State department 1992 report on Haiti
"As for the United States, since shortly after the overthrow -- when Secretary of State James Baker echoed President Bush's famous "this aggression will not stand" statement about Iraq -- little consideration has been given to backing up American principles in Haiti with American muscle Virtually all observers agree that facing down Haiti's ill-equipped and undisciplined 7,000-man army would take little in the way of force. Recently, an adviser of the provisional Government of the army-backed Prime Minister Marc L. Bazin repeated Father Aristide's longtime complaint when he said that "all it would take is one phone call" from Washington to send the army leadership packing… supporters and opponents of Father Aristide agree, nothing more threatening than a leaky and ineffective embargo, quickly imposed … has ever been seriously contemplated, which reflects Washington’s deep-seated ambivalence about a leftward-tilting nationalist [who] often depicted the United States as a citadel of evil and the root of many of his country’s problems. … Despite much blood on the army’s hands, United States diplomats consider it a vital counterweight to Father Aristide, whose class-struggle rhetoric … threatened or antagonized traditional power centers at home and abroad." Aristide Seeks More Than Moral Support NYT Sept. 27, 1992
"Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. … we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. … we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role" Excerpts From Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival' NYT March 8, 1992
"We will engage terrestrial targets someday—ships, airplanes, land targets—from space. … We’re going to fight in space. We’re going to fight from space and we’re going to fight into space." 1996 the Space Command’s commander in chief, Gen. Joseph Ashy, Waging War in Space The Nation December 9th 1999
"In November 138 nations voted in the UN General Assembly to reaffirm the Outer Space Treaty and its provision that space “shall be for peaceful purposes.” Only the United States and Israel abstained. Assistant secretary of the Air Force for Space Keith Hall says, “Space dominance, we have it, we like it and we’re going to keep it.” Waging War in Space The Nation December 9th 1999
"The new [military preparedness] standard is to maintain military superiority over all potential rivals and to prepare now for future military rivalries even if they can not yet be identified and their eventual arrival is only speculative. … Military requirements have become detached from net assessments of actual security threats. Generic wars and generic capabilities are proffered as the basis for planning. … Particularities of real threat scenarios have become secondary to the generalized need to show raw U.S. power across the globe" U.S. Military-Strategic Ambitions: Expanding to Fill the post-Soviet Vacuum Project on Defense Alternatives Charles Knight.adapted from a panel presentation at the Council on Foreign Relations, N.Y.C. 14 June 2000
"The presence of American forces in critical regions around the world is the visible expression of the extent of America’s status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability.”Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources For a New Century”— A report of the Project for the New American Century (Washington, DC), September 2000 Page 14
"The Bush administration, in a secret policy review completed early this year, has ordered the Pentagon to draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, naming not only Russia and the "axis of evil"--Iraq, Iran, and North Korea--but also China, Libya and Syria.
In addition, the U.S. Defense Department has been told to prepare for the possibility that nuclear weapons may be required in some future Arab-Israeli crisis. And, it is to develop plans for using nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical or biological attacks, as well as "surprising military developments" of an unspecified nature.
These and a host of other directives, including calls for developing bunker-busting mini-nukes and nuclear weapons that reduce collateral damage, are contained in a still-classified document called the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was delivered to Congress on Jan. 8." LA Times Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable March 10th 2002
"Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States. … America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. … We must deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed. … We cannot let our enemies strike first. … To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States wil, if necessary, act preemptively" Full Text: Bush's National Security StrategyNYT Sept. 20, 2002
"Since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed; 90-95% of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction have been verifiably eliminated. This includes all of the factories used to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; the associated equipment of these factories; and the vast majority of the products coming out of these factories." Even if Iraq managed to hide these weapons, what they are now hiding is harmless goo’ The Guardian 18 Sep 2002
"dismantled extensive nuclear weapons-related facilities. We neutralized Iraq’s nuclear program. We confiscated its weapon-usable material. We destroyed, removed or rendered harmless all its facilities and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production" Inspections Are the Key By Mohamed El BaradeiOctober 21, 2002 Washington Post chief nuclear inspector for ensuring Iraq's disarmament
"International misunderstanding is almost wholly voluntary: it is that contradiction in terms, intentional misunderstanding—a contradiction, because in order to misunderstand deliberately, you must at least suspect if not actually understand what you intend to misunderstand. … [The US misunderstanding of the USSR has] the function of sustaining a myth—the myth of the United States as “the last, best hope of mankind.” St. George and the Dragon is a poor show without a real dragon, the bigger and scalier the better, ideally with flames coming out of its mouth. The misunderstanding of Soviet Russia has become indispensable to the self-esteem of the American nation: he will not be regarded with benevolence who seeks, however ineffectually, to deprive them of it" The Guardian (London), 10 October 1983, Enchoch Powell
"the Army dug into captured Nazi chemical warfare documents describing Sarin, a nerve gas so lethal that a few pounds could kill thousands of people in minutes. … By the mid-nineteen-fifties, the Army was manufacturing thousands of gallons of Sarin" New York Times , 9 August 1970 IV Page 3
"As Americans we repudiate our Government’s threat to cut off food from Italy unless the election results please us. Hungry children must not go unfed because their parents do not vote as ordered from abroad." NYT 12th of April 1948
"Cabinet members and army generals, political party leaders and members of the Establishment, all made open references to American wishes or views in order to justify or to account for their own actions or positions" Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint
"we have established practical control … over national budget, taxation, currency issuance, price and wage policies, and state economic planning, as well as over imports and exports, the issuance of foreign exchange and the direction of military reconstruction and relief expenditures.” memorandum from Athens dated 17 November 1947, from the American Mission to Aid Greece to the State Department in Washington sent by Horace Smith of AMAG; U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59
"It is no exaggeration to state that South Korea no longer exists as a country. Its towns have been destroyed, much of its means of livelihood eradicated, and its people reduced to a sullen mass dependent upon charity and exposed to subversive influences. When the war ends no gratitude can be expected from the South Koreans, but it is to be hoped that the lesson will have been learned that it is worse than useless to destroy to liberate. Certainly, western Europe would never accept such a “liberation” Brassey’s Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book 1951
"The British are believed to favor active stimulation of a change in the present regime in Syria, in an effort to assure a pro-Western orientation on the part of future Syrian governments. … The United States shares the concern of the British Government over the situation in Syria" Declassified Documents Reference System 1985 volume, document no. 283, March 1957
"The USSR has shown no intention of direct intervention in any of the previous Mid-Eastern crises, and we believe it is unlikely that they would intervene, directly, to assure the success of a leftist coup in Syria" Declassified Documents Reference System , (Arlington, Va.) 1981 volume, document 471B, 17 June 1957.
"[The Laos operation] is something of which we can be proud as Americans. It has involved virtually no American casualties. What we are getting for our money there… is, I think, to use the old phrase, very cost effective." US Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Fiscal Year 1972 Authorizations , 22 July 1971, p . 4289.
"Tortures range from simple but brutal blows from a truncheon to electric shocks. Often the torture is more refined: the end of a reed is placed in the anus of a naked man hanging suspended downwards on the pau de arara [parrot’s perch] and a piece of cotton soaked in petrol is lit at the other end of the reed. Pregnant women have been forced to watch their husbands being tortured. Other wives have been hung naked beside their husbands and given electric shocks on the sexual parts of their body, while subjected to the worst kind of obscenities. Children have been tortured before their parents and vice versa. At least one child, the three month old baby of Virgilio Gomes da Silva was reported to have died under police torture. The length of sessions depends upon the resistance capacity of the victims and have sometimes continued for days at a time." Report on Allegations of Torture in Brazil (London, 1974) Page 40
"We obviously place a priority on improving relations with our adversary. We have to seek a balance with the US, so naturally we will say [to the Cubans] calm down, we are not interested in sharpening the situation in Angola and Nicaragua.”
"were out of bounds, owing to the fact that they had no reason to be there. The whole world knows that they shouldn’t have gone there. They messed up. If the United States set up a barricade anywhere and someone acted in the same way we would also start firing.” Marine in Panama
"But we knew that the United States would not let us be overrun. I spent too much time in Washington to make that mistake, and received a constant stream of visitors here. The American policy was clear. Only Saddam didn’t understand it" Milton Viorst, “A Reporter At Large: After the Liberation”, The New Yorker , 30 September 1991
"Seems driven more by upcoming budget battles on Capitol Hill than a potential battle against Saddam Hussein.” Washington Post , 25 November 1990, Lawrence Korb